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THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

JANUARY, 1874.

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WILL APPEAR, BESIDES OTHER MATTER, THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES, IF SPACE PERMITS:

- I. The Philosophy of Law (conclusion), by James Hutchinson Stirling, LL.D., of Edinburgh. *This is a reprint.*
- II. Interpretation of Kant's Critic of Pure Reason (continuation), by Simon S. Laurie, F.R.S., of Edinburgh.
- III. An Extended Introduction to Speculative Logic and Philosophy, by Professor A. Vera of the University of Naples.
- IV. Chapters from the Rational Psychology and other Writings of Herbart, translated by H. Haanel.
- V. On the Music of Schuman, Liszt, and others, by Professor E. Sobolewski. [This distinguished composer was engaged on a series of articles for this Journal at the time of his death in the summer of 1872.]
- VI. Schopenhauer: Another Extract from the *Parerga* and *Paralipomena*. Translated by Dr. C. Joséfé.
- VII. Aristotle's *De Anima*, translated and accompanied with a Commentary by Prof. Thomas Davidson.
- VIII. From Hegel's History of Philosophy, the articles on "The Sophists" and "Socrates," together with the continuation of the article on "Aristotle" published in Vol. V. of this Journal, by the Editor.
- IX. Shakespeare's *Midsummer's Night Dream* and *The Tempest*, Essays by D. J. Snider.
- X. On the Music of Color, by Charles E. Steth Smith, of London.
- XI. On the Philosophy of Religion, by the Editor.
- XII. On Hegel's Method, by the Editor.
- XIII. Kant's Ethics, by J. B. Edmunds.
- XIV. Philosophemes, by A. Bronson Alcott.
- XV. Fichte's Critique of Schelling, translated by A. E. Kroeger.;
- XVI. Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit", with Commentary by the Editor.

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No. 1.

ROSENKRANZ ON HEGEL'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Translated from the German of Dr. K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL.

The third great work which Michelet elaborated from Hegel's posthumous papers was the History of Philosophy. This subject was treated with very unequal merit in its different parts. Ancient philosophy is treated as a totality, and its presentation is quite uniform and is made from original authorities; that of the middle ages is very inorganic, and is composed from secondary sources and with the manifest wish to get through it as quickly as possible. Recent philosophy again is studied exhaustively from original sources, although more according to the chronological succession of the chief systems than in a proper historico-genetic bearing and construction. Often there are only extracts from cardinal works, with brief introductions and critical remarks, which give a rich fulness of insight in pithy, characteristic words; and the readiness with which he assumes a kind of frank superiority aids him here to the most happy and vigorous periods.

Hegel prepared for no other undertaking so carefully as for this History. He exhaustively wrought out the determination of its domain, its distinction from related departments, its position in the system, its divisions, its ordinary conception, its sources, and its necessary method of treatment. The History of Philosophy records facts, but facts which are

thoughts, and not merely thoughts in general, but such as have the conception of the absolute for their content; if it states, in a merely objective way, that a philosopher then and there taught this or that, it remains without a connective idea. It should rather show how the thoughts of different philosophers are developed from one another, what relation subsists between the false and the true in a given philosophy, and how progress cannot refute its previous stand-point as a mere error without at the same time confirming its positive content. All philosophies in and for themselves are only philosophy itself. The system of philosophy must integrate all stand-points as organic moments, as categories of its different spheres.

Philosophers do not elaborate their systems apart from all connection with universal history. It is often thought that they project unique ideas of God and the world from purely speculative idiosyncrasy, while in fact they stand in the most intimate relation with the spirit of peoples and with the movement of mankind. They seek to fathom, by solitary reflection, that which more or less engages all contemporaries, and to express with all possible clearness what is often the open secret of the age. When the sequence of philosophical systems appears only as a gallery of fortuitous opinions, nothing seems more comfortless than the study of the history of philosophy, and nothing but superficial skepticism, the profane stand-point of a Pilate, can be the result. Criticism, according to Hegel, does not consist in applying the measure of one presupposed system upon another, or upon all systems. It should arise from the development of a system as its own critique, in which the consequences of its stand-point reveal the imperfections which it involves, and at the same time disclose the positive germ which constitutes its imperishable truth and thereby its historic right. Philosophy must be learned from the history of philosophy. Hegel would say that philosophy, as well as every other science which has a name—or, as we often say, an authority—may recall a necessary and eternally true conception. Harvey and the discovery of the circulation of the blood, Copernicus and the true theory of our planetary system, are synonyms. So too, in philosophy. The Eleatic stand-point

and the conception of self-identical Being, Plato and the conception of true, affirmative dialectics, Aristotle and the conception of teleology, &c., are all identical. Were this not so, philosophizing would be entirely without results, which is indeed a very common view of it, ascribing to it at most the utility of a certain formal exercise of thought. The highest system is not merely an external summation of foregoing systems, but their vital unity, which sublates them into itself, and thereby acquires for itself new illumination and a relatively changed significance. Hegel claimed to have harvested into his own the truth of all preceding systems, and not merely to have gathered them synthetically into a syncretistic aggregate, but rather to have posited them at the same time analytically with immanent dialectics and as self-producing and cancelling moments of the totality. It should not be imagined, as it often is, that he expected to find, point for point, in history the sequence of the determinations of his system, or, in its determinations, to find the temporal succession of philosophers, although on the whole a marked coincidence might be admitted. In a philosophy one side of the absolute will be emphasized as its qualitative element, but from it the philosopher will seek to apprehend and present the whole; as Plato not only established the conception of dialectics, but from it sought to develop the conception of nature and mind.

In the perfect and clear consciousness which Hegel had concerning the process of the history of philosophy down to his own time, he stands alone among modern philosophers: I say modern, because among the ancients Aristotle took a similar position, as his Introduction to *Metaphysics* and his other numerous references to other philosophers show. Leibnitz also was unusually well versed in the history of philosophy, as his treatise *De arte combinatoria* especially shows; but he lacked the proper conception of its inner connection, which gave Hegel so great superiority and externally so great repose. Brucker, Tennemann, and Buhle, Hegel's predecessors in this department, were perhaps superior to him in the extent of their erudition, but they lacked depth of speculative penetration, imitative vitality of reproduction, and the sharpness of universal criticism, which is not confined

within the circle of Wolffian or Kantian categories. When Hegel expounds foreign systems, he does not merely quote the decisive words in the language of the original—all the others do that—but he translates and expounds them; and it is this attempt at correct objective apprehension which throws a charm over such passages, as well as the exquisite tact with which he discriminates between the essential and the unessential, the philosophical and the unphilosophical.

According to human seeming, it is much to be regretted that Hegel was not himself permitted to bring the history of philosophy out of the crude state of lecture-manuscripts to full maturity and perfection for the public. What an entirely different finishing it would then have received, and how the grouping of single parts would have been transformed! As it is, it is invaluable, and has exercised a most abiding influence upon the elaboration of this discipline. In its philosophical content it is classic, but in form it is imperfect. From single extracts we may compute what he sought to have achieved. His presentation of Plato's system, made with such predilection and perfection, deserves especial praise. Other historians, e.g. Brandis, in his history of ancient philosophy, has presented a very true and comprehensive picture of the Platonic doctrine, but it is dry and cold; so that, with all the citations which he printed under the text, we can attain to no vital understanding, to no penetration into the real essence of Plato's system. The poetic endowment and the myth-building phantasy of Plato have been ever admired, but where, down to Hegel, do we find a single rational word concerning the relation of this mythic system to speculation proper? Hegel does not merely refer, but, as a philosopher, coöperates in the formation of a principle; he strives with the striver, and this invests his statements, even where æsthetically they are unsatisfactory, with an infinite charm. We feel ourselves transported to the secret laboratory of thought where mind thirsts for knowledge. How many and voluminous reproductions of Spinoza's *Ethics* and of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* we have had within the past century, and how weary we became in reading them, and how duped with the expectation that now the true light was about to dawn upon us; while the brief, somewhat slovenly pre-

sensation of Hegel, penetrating however with freedom into the ground of the subject, enlightens us at once! This he did often, with a sort of rude pedagogical manner, even in dealing with the greatest philosophers.

It might be expected in the construction of this History that Hegel would divide it into Oriental, Antique, and Christian. This he essentially did. Yet he is unwilling to recognize Oriental philosophy. He makes a beginning first with the Greeks because they first formed states with free constitutions, and true philosophy is impossible without political freedom. He discourses nevertheless upon Chinese and Indian philosophy. It has been often remarked that the abstractions of the Oriental world do not suffice for the critical estimates of concrete history. The Chinese and Hindoos have not philosophized like the Greeks, but they have philosophized. The Chinese, as rational moralists, have cultivated practical philosophy; the Hindoos, as essentially religious men, have cultivated metaphysics and psychology. How can the Chinese Mengtseu, who vindicated to the inhabitants of a state under certain conditions the *jus revolutionis* against their prince, from the conception of the state, be called other than a philosopher? This he did not do as a poet, or a prophet, or a priest, but as a prosy-thinking Confucian.

Or, among the Hindoos, can Kanada, whom Hegel mentions on account of his doctrine of categories, be refused the name of philosopher? After all it avails nothing, especially since the further investigations in this domain since Hegel's death, to seek either to ignore or to exclude the Orientals; for they have philosophized, though they have taken a lower standpoint than the Greeks.

The History of Ancient Philosophy is Hegel's historical master-piece. Details may be disputed, here and there he may be corrected and supplemented, as Zeller has done; but in essentials he is correct, and in the delineation of details he is unsurpassable. He preserves his power to the end, while that of historians often falters before Neo-platonism. They generally excuse themselves by loudly disparaging it as eclecticism and mysticism, so that we seek in vain for a clear conception of it, and are lost in wonder that philoso-

phers like Plotinus and Proclus, who have evidently studied Plato and Aristotle profoundly, should have erred so extravagantly.

The History of Mediæval Philosophy, in spite of a few genial touches, is the weakest of all his works. He had a general dislike for the middle ages. To him it was an age of barbarism, where little that was congenial was to be found. Erdmann, a follower of Hegel, in his admirable text-book on the History of Philosophy, has especially treated scholasticism after the French, e.g. Cousin, Rousselot, Hauréau, and others, had preceded him.

Respecting Hegel's disposition and criticism of Arabic and Jewish philosophers there is much to be said, but this would take us too far from our proper theme. We must conclude the same also with reference to the History of Modern Philosophy. It is too desultory, and lacks, from the effort at compendious abridgment in order to hurry through with the material before the end of the semester, a formal completeness. It becomes, in fact, even more difficult to follow and describe the movements of thought in Modern Europe, because, by the mediation of printing, the diffusion of systems has become much more rapid and wide, and extends from nation to nation in a way and to a degree which cannot be estimated, so that a wide margin must be left for chance; but especially because religious (or more properly ecclesiastical and political) interests now play so great a part. The crossing of systems, and the number of hybrid formations and of syncretic mediation, as well as the numerous efforts which have the appearance of originality, but which are often the misunderstood reproductions of long anterior systems, grows towards infinity. How much of all this mass deserves notice? The literary historian of philosophy is unquestionably bound to register subordinate and even inferior authorities, the philosophical author must be allowed to confine himself to the epoch-making central figures. If principles are strictly adhered to, the divisions of the history of philosophy, in accordance with those of universal history, will be found to arrange themselves very simply about the antithesis of ethnicism and monotheism, and their sublation into Christianity.

I. The Philosophy of Ethnicism.

1. Chinese philosophy; realism.
2. Indian philosophy; idealism.
3. Græco-Roman philosophy; ideal realism.

II. Philosophy of Monotheism.

The Jews and the Mohammedans have themselves produced no independent philosophy, because they were under no necessity to do so. Only by contact with the Greeks were they impelled to make the attempt to construe the world of thought in accordance with their faith, as was first done by Philo with extraordinary acuteness and with remarkable phantasy. The vast number of the philosophical writings of the Arabians must not make us forget their dependence upon the Greeks. All finally centres about the substantive and operative predicates of God. Christian scholastics have borrowed from the Arabs and Jews, but the converse has never taken place. Christians quote Averrhoës and Moses Maimonides, but Arabs and Jews do not quote Abelard and Thomas Aquinas.

III. The Philosophy of Christianity.

- A. First period: the philosophy of faith. 1. Gnosticism. 2. Patristic philosophy. 3. Scholasticism.
- B. Second period: philosophy as an independent science. 1. The reaction of national individuality against ecclesiastical scholasticism. (a) Dogmatism in Italy; Platonic in Florence, Peripatetic in Lombardy, individualistic in Campania. Bruno, Vanini, Campanella. (b) Skepticism in France; Pierre de la Ramée, Sanchez, La Mothe le Vayer, Montaigne, Charcon, Gassendi. (c) Empiricism in England; Bacon of Verulam (already anticipated by the scholastic Roger Bacon). (d) Theosophy in Germany; Paracelsus, Weigel, Jacob Böhme. 2. Philosophy as a rational science. (a) The idealism of the principle of substantiality; (a) Cartesius, (β) Spinoza, (γ) Leibnitz. It recedes partly into mysticism and scholasticism. (b) Realism of the principle of subjectivity as *éclaircissement* of the understanding; (a) in the sensism and skepticism of England, (β) in the materialism and atheism of France, (γ) in the eudæmonism and deism of Germany. (c) Kant's critical idealism and the systematic formation of philosophy resulting therefrom.

Let this simple outline be kept in mind and it will not be difficult to group into their proper place all the enlargements of a principle, its amalgamation with others, its often striking correlation with seemingly contradictory potencies, without forced or artificial constructions. What Hegel says respecting individual thinkers is always profound, but his construction is not free from confusion, and often conceals the natural course of development which he followed. What is individual also naturally finds its proper place in the epochs here indicated, and thus the colossal genius of Kant, who first grasped together the antithesis of the subjective and objective principle in a truly scientific synthesis, may be recognized even more justly than it has been done by Hegel.

The history and the absolute system of philosophy should, according to Hegel, cover the same ground. There should be found in history no system, of which the principle wherein lies its truth and its justification, cannot be proved to be an organic moment of the systematic totality. Thus the history constitutes the critique of the system of philosophy, and the system the critique of the history. By this, of course, it is not to be understood that the same stand-point may not be empirically repeated in history, i.e. Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Epicureanism, Stoicism, Scholasticism, Materialism, &c., may appear repeatedly, and thus far they belong to history; but, first, they would always appear in new connections, which, in the general identity of its principle, would individualize it again and again; and, secondly, they would always be final stand-points to which history had advanced from former stand-points which here became merely relative. Hegel himself furnishes a very plain example of this. In his characterization of Proclus, it is plain that he fully accords with him in his general apprehension of the idea as a triad of triads. He commends Proclus because he so affirms the unity of the absolute that every triad within its own peculiar domain is at the same time a totality, because otherwise they could not harmonize with one another. He commends him because he distinguished triads as essence, life, and mind (*οὐσιον, ζωτικόν, νοερὸν εἶναι*). He commends him because, in the conception of essence, following the Philebus of Plato, he distinguished limit, the unlimited, and measure (*πέρας*,

ἀκρον, μέτρον, or, as Proclus says, *συμμετρία*), precisely as Hegel himself began with the categories of quality, quantity, and measure. He commends him because he characterizes the νοῦς as the return (*ἐπιστροφή*) to the logical idea, just as he himself did, &c. Is Hegel's system, therefore, a mere repetition of that of Proclus? Certainly not. Contrasted with Hegel's system that of Proclus is only an abstract sketch with tedious and diffuse dialectics, with nature wrapped in shadows, and with a superabundance of artificial theology, while the logical idea of Hegel becomes real flesh and blood, and freedom organizes itself into the concrete form of the State. Mention had often been made of a law in the History of Philosophy. Dogmatism, skepticism, and criticism; or objectivity, subjectivity, and the absolute; or idealism, realism, and ideal realism; or analytic, synthetic, and eclectic systems, had succeeded one another; it is also quite right to discern such connections, because every one-sidedness engenders its antithesis, and the antithesis demands sublation into a higher unity, but, since the element of chance pervades history, no scheme can be established as an unconditional norm without incurring the danger of putting a forced construction upon facts. The principal fact ever remains that every system does criticize itself in its own consequences, and thus aids in producing from itself a relatively higher stand-point. This Hegel saw more profoundly than any of his predecessors, and explained most admirably, in the Introduction to his History, as the conception of the development of philosophy. This idea embraces what is sought for under the name of a philosophy of the history of philosophy, or a law for its process. Because Hegel believed that he had articulated all essential stand-points, of both previous and contemporary systems, into their proper place in his system as organic moments of the idea, he rightly regarded it not merely as the most perfect and complete, but as the most critical, because a vital unity pervaded all parts of the whole, and thus, in an immanent way, brought to bear, not only positively but negatively, a criticism of details.

COMPLETION OF THE HEGELIAN SYSTEM IN THE SECOND EDITION OF THE "ENCYCLOPEDIA" IN 1827.

The exoteric occasion of a new edition of his *Encyclopedia* determined Hegel to make his system as accessible as possible from without. This he could not do without foregoing further discussion upon its subject-matter, and striving to give to it a finished and final form. This edition, which was completed but a short time before his death, remained unaltered. He added a new chapter to the Introduction, in which he presented the attitude of thought towards objectivity, as metaphysics of the understanding, as empiricism, as critical philosophy, and as immediate knowledge. He gave greater scope to philosophy of nature, psychology, and to practical philosophy, and shed light on many questions of the day, e.g. the relation of philosophy to religion, the conception of state constitutions and of the budget, and in how far the name *law* was unfitting for a pecuniary grant, &c. The simple articulation of the whole suffered from the addition of these didactic ornaments.

His *Philosophy of Nature*, a department of such intense interest for our age, was printed, in the general edition of his works, with the appendices which Michelet gathered from Hegel's lectures in this field. Valuable as these are, it is still to be regretted that he did not treat this science as exhaustively as he did the *Æsthetics*, or *Philosophy of History*, or the *Philosophy of Religion*. The form of a commentary upon paragraphs as they occur in a text-book brings unavoidable repetitions, misplacements, and, from the nature of the material treated, great contingency. In the sciences of organic nature these appendices sink to the rank of mere extracts which Hegel had made, for the purpose of his own study, from Treviranus, Authenrieth, Bichat, &c. We may, however, hence infer to how great an extent, and with what extraordinary attentiveness, he pursued empirical sciences, while at the same time the wish becomes strong to see this mass more clearly and sharply organized. We may conclude from many merely casual and passing expressions that Hegel was not wanting in a poetic sense for nature, as is often affirmed of him; but that the picture of the phenomenon,

which hung before him clear in all its most exquisite details, became often very loosely bound by its logical frame, and that much which is admirable and original—which indeed is often found—did not attain to the reality to which it was entitled on account of this incompleteness. It is to an Italian philosopher, August Vera, that the great merit belongs of having translated Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* into French, and of furnishing it with an admirable commentary in which the peculiarity and fruitfulness of Hegel's intuitions on nature are convincingly exhibited.

Recent natural science declares that nature can be conceived only atomically. It is resolved, it asserts, to proceed only empirically; its method must be inductive, i.e. analytical. An atom however is an hypothesis, for experience cannot make it a subject of observation. Instead of being empiric, it is also metaphysical; instead of being inductive, it is deductive. The atom, it is said, is matter as the infinitely small, which is absolutely unchangeable. In order that a movement of atoms may become possible, a void must, in the second place, be postulated for it, which the originators of this doctrine quite rightly did. This void modern thought has determined to be not merely space but æther. Since, then, æther must be distinguished from space, it has been found necessary to make it also consist of atoms, so that we have on the one hand the atoms of æther, and on the other the atoms of concrete materiality. In order that they may not be idle, a repellant force is ascribed to the former and an attractive force to the latter. All these fictions aim to give to the phenomena of nature a purely mechanical basis, and to subject them to the laws of the calculus. Since physical and especially chemical processes cannot thus be reached, a warm envelop has been ascribed to atoms. Thus they are made small planets.

All the real progress of recent natural science has been made by observation conducted according to the conclusions of induction and analogy. The atomic theory and its calculus has contributed nothing to this progress, but has rather obstructed and limited it. The category of quantity is in great requisition for the processes and forms of nature; but this must not, because it necessarily contains the extremes

of the infinitely large and the infinitely small, be identified with atomism.

The Hegelian philosophy of nature is very far from undervaluing mathematics. It has expressly accepted it as a moment of natural science, but, in place of the artificial constraint which is put upon natural phenomena by premature expression in number, it seeks to posit the realism of spontaneous self-formation. The work of arithmetical formalism depends only upon the facts upon which the computations are made. If the former are false, the latter are barren. Very important rectifications, e.g., have become necessary in modern astronomy for the distances between the sun and the planets, as a result alone of a more accurate measurement of the velocity of light.

Hegel attempts to apply dialectics to the scientific treatment of nature. He did this himself in a very imperfect way, but there is no doubt that science will be compelled to come back eventually to this method. He distinguishes (1) Mechanics, (2) Physics, (3) Organics. If we put in their place the content of these special sciences, we shall have (1) Matter, (2) Force, (3) Life. If we translate these conceptions into abstract categories, they will read, (1) Substantiality, (2) Causality, (3) Teleology.

According to the Hegelian method, each of these spheres has an immanent conformity to law in itself, which becomes phenomenal (1) as weight, (2) as qualitative change, (3) as determination of form. But these differences sublate themselves, as consecutive, both forward and backward. The truth of matter is force, and the truth of force is life. Life, as the absolute end of nature, presupposes the other spheres as its conditions. Of late only matter and force are talked of, though form is equally important in nature, because, by virtue of it, first the individual, and then life, become possible. Organic cells are now treated atomically in order to construct organisms as mere mechanisms from them, but the cell is essentially an individualizing power developing itself into a distinct shape. It is not enough to say that organism is endowed with vital force, for the former is, through and through, the *nisus formandi*, according to Blumenbach, or inner conformity to an end, according to Kant.

Hegel's apprehension of the conception of life is profound, but its depth is but little elaborated in the extent of the thousand-fold forms of nature, i.e. all morphology is omitted.

Hegel believes the earth to be the only star upon which life exists. This may easily excite surprise, and it is readily admitted that, empirically, we cannot know whether or not organic beings exist upon other stars, e.g. Venus and Mars. As a strict systematizer, however, he could not do otherwise than vindicate to the Earth this superiority. Bessel, in a treatise on the physical constitution of the world, and Whewell, in his "Plurality of Worlds," have arrived at the same result. The further conclusion that, in the entire universe, a history has been unfolded only upon the Earth, is unavoidable.

The infinite multiplicity of the heavenly bodies did not embarrass Hegel. This he regarded as a "mere" infinity which was no more imposing than the infinite multiplicity of infusoria, or insects, &c. He disapproves of the measureless admiration of natural phenomena which placed them above the productions of mind. Thus a tiny infusorium, because it was a living individual, stood infinitely higher than a constellation which is inorganic, although ever so gigantic in its mass.

INTRODUCTION TO SPECULATIVE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY.

By A. VERA.

CHAPTER III.

§ 1. *Preliminary Remarks to Legitimate Logic.*

We may now dismiss old Logic as artificial, arbitrary, and inadequate for the attainment of truth, and turn our attention to legitimate and rational Logic and to the principles upon which it must be firmly established.

First of all, it ought to be borne in mind that if there be a logical Science, it must be an absolute Science, or a part or division of the absolute Science. And by absolute Science, I mean a Science which inquires into, and is adequate to, the

absolute and eternal nature both of thought and things. For neither thought which is not the right thought of its object, nor the object which is not rationally thought, is science. Nor is it science if it is thought which is not an absolute, but a limited, transient, and accidental thought. Thus in dividing, defining, classifying, in deducing Ideas, or in affirming the Infinite and describing its attributes, either thought grasps and defines the inward and immutable nature of things, in which case there will be science, or it performs mental operations which are not necessarily and inwardly connected with the nature of things, in which case there will only be the shadow of science, nay, mere delusion and phantoms of the imagination.

This shows how unfounded is the division, generally admitted, of Truth into *logical* and *metaphysical* truth, a sister distinction to that we have just exploded between *Reason* and *Reasoning*. For it will be easily perceived that if Logical truth, whatever it may be, is not an absolute truth, it is no truth at all. If, on the contrary, it is an absolute truth, it possesses in its own sphere and attribution a worth and importance equal to that of Metaphysical truth—indeed it is itself a metaphysical truth. In fact, if there be an absolute Science, this Science must be Logic. All sciences presuppose Logic, whilst Logic presupposes none. All sciences avail themselves of logical processes and notions; nor could they attain their own peculiar object without bringing them into action, as it were. Even taking Logic as it now stands, it is easy to see that all sciences—Mathematics, Physics, Ontology, &c.—borrow from it a part of their own subject-matter. And by borrowing I mean this, namely, that all Sciences make, and cannot but make, Logical principles and substance (if I am allowed the expression) a part of their own substance, like the plant that borrows from surrounding elements strength and life. And as earth, air, and light, constitute an integral part of the plant's life and nature, so Logic must be considered as a necessary and essential element of all Sciences, and consequently of all Thought and Being. In fact, it would be irrational and inconsistent to admit that Logic is the universal organon of truth, that there is no being that can be apprehended or understood unless it goes

through some logical process, and to refuse at the same time to Logic all objective and consubstantial connection with the very being known through it. Indeed, if we look closely into the subject, we will perceive that, by taking this view of Logic, we admit that there are two Logical sciences, a Logic eternal and absolute, according to which things are made, arranged, and thought; and a Logic finite, accidental, and arbitrarily contrived for our special use and purpose. But then we must give up Logic—and, with Logic, Science—as useless and deceptive, and as holding out expectations it is absolutely unable to fulfil. For we use it in the expectation of attaining through it the real knowledge of things, and actually find that our knowledge has no other foundation, nor any other object, but our own transitory notion, and the negative and limited conceptions of our mind.

In order to arrive at a correct view of Logic we must, therefore, view it as a Science in the strict sense of the word, viz. as a Science of *Knowing* and *Being*, whose principles constitute at once the principles of thought and the principles of things; so that if we were, for instance, to realize it as the Science of *Form*, we should not consider the Form, as old Logic does, namely, as a merely *subjective Form*, but as a Form embracing the twofold sides of existence—the subjective and the objective, thought and the thing thought—in the unity of its nature.

§ 2. *On Science in general.*

As Logic, whatever be its importance, constitutes only a part of the Absolute, or of the Absolute Science, we cannot form a clear notion of Logic unless we give an insight into Science in general, its conditions, its bearing, and the part it plays in the constitution and the existence of the Universe.

(a) *Is there an Absolute Science?*

If there be an absolute Science, this must be the Science of the Absolute, and, *vice versa*, if there be an Absolute, there must be an absolute Science. For an Absolute without an absolute Science is no absolute, and an absolute Science without an absolute object is not an absolute Science. The absolute Science and the Absolute, the absolute thought and the absolute object of thought, are therefore reciprocally and

inseparably connected, or, to speak more properly, are the two sides of one and the same being. The question now is whether the Absolute is within the reach of the human mind; and as it is a question of vital importance, and bearing upon Logic as well as upon Science in general, I will dwell at some length upon it.

The opinion respecting the capability of the human mind to attain absolute knowledge may, I think, be divided into three heads.

First, there are those who entirely refuse to the human mind the power of reaching the Absolute. The Absolute, if it exist, they argue, is a *Deus absconditus*; it is a Being into whose ineffable and inscrutable nature no human eye can penetrate. In fact, is not man an imperfect and finite being? How, then, could he comprehend the Perfect and the Infinite?

Secondly, there are others who steer an intermediate course. These do not say that we are refused all knowledge of the Absolute, but that our knowledge does not extend beyond its existence. We know that the Absolute *is*, but we are not allowed to know *what* it is, and to have an insight into its nature, its attributes and perfections.

Finally, others go one step farther, and admit that we are capable of apprehending both its existence and some of its attributes, as, for instance, that it is Infinite, All-powerful, All-wise, &c., without being able to reach the very length, the essence of its nature, nor to determine clearly and in a *positive* manner what these attributes are; and consequently, according to this tenet, we would know that the Absolute is All-wise, Omnipotent, &c., without comprehending *what* omnipotence, all-wisdom, &c., are.

Although these doctrines seem, at first sight, to stand on different bases, and to represent different opinions, they start in reality from the same point of view—the inadequacy of the human mind for the attainment of absolute knowledge; and lead to the same result—the negation of Science, or Skepticism. Indeed the two latter, though apparently more comprehensive and more condescending, as it were, towards the human mind, labor, when compared with the former, under the disadvantage of inconsistency; and the third, which seems to conciliate matters and to hit upon the right solu-

tion is the most inconsistent of the two. In fact there is no inconsistency in affirming that man's mind is utterly inadequate for absolute knowledge. There may be error, but there is no inconsistency; whilst in the other two opinions error is coupled with inconsistency, as they state both, and the latter more explicitly than the second, that man can reach the Absolute, and then they take up, so to speak, the opposite thesis, in the same proposition, and state that he is unable to reach it; and although the inconsistency does not appear in the expression, it is not the less involved in the real meaning.

The second doctrine teaches that we are allowed to know that God *is*, but we are forbidden to advance a step farther. If we were to trace the origin of this doctrine, we should find that it arises from a superficial view of the subject, and from an application equally superficial and erroneous of the analogical and inductive process to absolute knowledge. Here is a tree, or an animal, or myself. As I can affirm that a tree *is*, or that I *am*, without knowing the nature of the tree or my own, so likewise can I affirm that God *is*, although I may be unable to comprehend His attributes and nature.

Now this manner of arguing is erroneous and deceptive even within the sphere of experimental perception. For the perception of the existence of all objects which come within the pale of experience is inseparable from the perception of some of their qualities; as, for instance, that the tree occupies a portion of space; that it has color, leaves, &c.; and its existence is made known to me through some of these qualities. Nor am I conscious of my existence save by apprehending myself either as a thinking, or as an active, or as a sensitive being. Now this connection between the existence and the attributes of a being is still more intimate and inseparable in God. For when we say that God *is*, we do not mean that He *is* like anything finite, or falling under the senses, but that He *is* in such a manner as is conformable with the perfection of His nature. Consequently, the affirmation of the existence of God involves already the apprehension of the *manner* in which God exists, that is to say, of a part or aspect of the Divine nature. Besides, when we state that God *is*, either the word *God* is a mere word, an empty sound, and then the proposition means nothing; or it has a meaning,

and then it means that the *Absolute*, or the *Perfect Being*, or the *Ens realissimum*, etc., *is*; i.e. it expresses some essential and necessary attribute of the nature of God. In fact, in God the *Esse essentialis* and the *Esse existentis*, to use the expression of Schoolmen, are more intimately blended than in finite beings; so that in God *to be* and *to be such* is one and the same thing. Nor could He *be* if He might be otherwise than He is, and, *vice versa*, were He otherwise than He is, He could not be. Consequently, to apprehend that God *is*, is to apprehend, in a certain manner, *what* He is; and to pretend that we can apprehend that God is, and then to say that we are not allowed to know what He is, is to deny, in the second part of the proposition what we have admitted in the first.

With respect to the third doctrine, it will be easily seen that it is still more inconsistent and arbitrary; for it states that we are allowed to apprehend a part only of the Absolute, and then it adds that even this part is known to us *negatively*; which means, in reality, that we do not know it at all

With regard to the first part of the proposition, namely, that we know, or are capable of knowing, a portion, a certain number of the attributes of the Absolute, but not the whole of His nature,—it will be observed that those who hold this doctrine break asunder artificially and arbitrarily the unity of the Absolute, and, after having thus disfigured, nay, annulled the absolute, say, this part of the absolute we can know, and this other part we are not allowed to know. But how can they say that there is a part, a sphere in the absolute which is beyond the reach of the mind, if the mind has no notion of it? If, on the contrary, the mind has some notion of it, how can they say that it is beyond the reach of the mind? Besides, is it not one and the same mind that apprehends in the one and the same absolute both the part which is known and that which is supposed to be unknown? If so, how could I affirm that the part supposed unknown in the absolute belongs really to the absolute, and constitutes the highest sphere of its nature and existence, if I have not actually, or am not allowed to have, any knowledge of it? The fact is that the absolute cannot be so dismembered; for, such is the unity of its nature, that of the Absolute, more

than any of other being, it may be truly said, that, if we cannot know all, we can know nothing of it.

But even granted that it would be rational to admit that we know only a part of the Absolute,—if the knowledge we possess of it is merely a *negative* one, such a knowledge is, in reality, no knowledge at all. In fact, to possess a *negative* knowledge of a thing, is not to know what *this thing is*, but what *it is not*. For instance, to have a *negative* knowledge of the *triangle* is not to know what the *triangle* is, but that the *triangle* is not a *square*; or to have a *negative* knowledge of a *tree* is not to know what the *tree* is, but that the *tree* is not a *mountain*; or to have a *negative knowledge* of the *good* is not to know what the *good* is, but that the *good* is neither the *evil*, nor the *beautiful*, nor any other thing. This manner of arguing seems, at first sight, quite plausible; for although I do not know, one would say, what a man is doing at the present moment, yet this I perfectly know, that he is neither writing, nor reading, nor sleeping, &c. All the strength of the argument lies in the assumption that we are able to know what a thing *is not* without knowing in any way what it is. Now it is quite plain that we cannot state what a thing is not unless we know in some manner what it is—unless, in other words, we possess some *positive* knowledge of it. For I must know in a *positive* manner what a man is to affirm that he is neither writing nor sleeping, &c.; nay, I must know that writing and sleeping are parts of his nature. And this connection of positive and negative knowledge is still more inseparable in matters eternal and absolute. To say that the Infinite is not the Finite requires that I should have some positive notion of what the Infinite is. And it is by comparing the positive notion of the Infinite with the Finite that I am enabled to draw the conclusion that the former is not the latter. Had I not some positive notion of the Infinite I could neither affirm that the Infinite *is*, nor that *it is* or *is not* in such and such a manner.

The fact is that we cannot consistently conceive two Sciences, an absolute science and a science which is not absolute—not any more than we can admit two Reasons, the human Reason and the Divine Reason, as substantially distinct. For by admitting two Reasons we would not only

admit that one Reason knows what the other does not know—a difference which exists within the limits of the human Reason and between man and man—but that what is knowledge and truth to the one is not, or may not be, knowledge and truth to the other. For if the Reason which apprehends mathematical or any other truth, in man, is not the Reason which apprehends the same truth in God, or if the Reason by which man apprehends God is of a different genus and substance from that by which God apprehends himself, all human knowledge is a mere delusion. Indeed all relation between God and man is at an end if God's and man's Reason does not flow from one and the same principle. And this would strike at the very root not only of Science but of Revelation also; as where there is not a community of nature, some identical faculty between the master and the disciple, there can be no teaching possible, let this take place either through an inward inspiration from mind to mind, or by word of mouth. Therefore the only solution of the problem—the solution which alone will be found, upon an impartial and close examination, consistent with science, religion and truth—is that the divine and the human reason, springing from one and the same source, are, as to their essence, one and the same reason.*

(b) *Nature and Characteristics of Science.*

To the uncultivated and unscientific mind Science appears as an accident, and a kind of superfluous luxury which is not required by any inward want or necessity of human nature. This is the point of view of purely sensitive life belonging to the undeveloped and elementary stage of existence, either national or individual—to what we might call the state of childhood and nature. Here the satisfaction of physical wants appears as the law of life. For, to quote the argument in its popular and crude form, there is necessity in eating and drinking, and in removing all unpleasurable sensation; but there is no necessity in learning.

However, man soon feels that physical life is not the supreme object of his existence, that there are wants of a higher order and more cognate with his own nature than physical

* See also on this question my book, lately published, "The Problem of the Absolute."

wants, and that the satisfaction of the former is a duty as imperative, nay, more imperative, than the satisfaction of the latter. For it is this that makes him what he is, a being who by his mind holds sway over the inanimate and brute creation, adapting it to his spiritual as well as to his material wants, elevating thereby the latter to a higher dignity, and imparting to them such beauty and perfection as they would never have possessed had not the mind stamped them with its own perfection. Here man acknowledges Science and reverences it: He acknowledges that Science is an object of paramount importance either as a moral and intellectual necessity, or as a source of the purest enjoyment, or as a means of conquering the blind and unruly forces of Nature. Now this acknowledgment is nothing else than the actual expression and manifestation of the *idea* of Science. In fact, the idea or notion of Science is, like the ideas of the Infinite, of the Beautiful, of Justice, of Number, &c., a primitive, objective, and necessary attribute of the mind; or, more exactly, it is a notion that springs from its very essence, and is more intimately inherent in it than any other notion, principle, or law. For it may be truly said that the mind is more absolutely and more irresistibly attracted towards Science than matter towards its centre; as a mind not possessing any desire for knowledge would be a sort of *contradictio in terminis*—it would be a mind which is not a mind, an understanding which is not an understanding. But this desire for knowledge, this inward and inextinguishable longing after truth, is nothing but a movement of the Intellect towards its natural object and nourishment, stimulated, as the Intellect is, by this very Idea of Science; so much so, that were the Idea erased from the Intellect, the longing also would thereby be extinguished.

If it be so, if Science rests on a primary notion or law of the mind, to determine the nature and essence of Science we have only to describe the essential feature and characteristics of this same notion.

First of all, the notion of Science and the notion of absolute Science are inseparable, or, more accurately speaking, are one and the same notion. All relative and finite knowledge conceals under various forms, and more or less visibly,

an infinite knowledge, from which it emanates and with which it is connected by necessary and inward bonds. Thus it may be truly said that the natural and predominant aspiration of the mind is not towards limited but absolute knowledge—an aspiration that rises with the rising of our intellectual activity. That world-embracing curiosity, that vague but profound and ardent desire for universal knowledge which is fermenting as it were in the innermost recess of our soul, is nothing else than the aspiration, still obscure and indefinite, after absolute science, of which subsequent inquiries are the greatest satisfaction and actual realization. This aspiration, or want, or whatever it be called, may be traced in every mind; and the only difference between them in this respect is the difference arising from the various degrees of their development, or from the influence which external and accidental causes—moral, social, and physical—exercise upon this development either to promote or to impede it, as well as from their application to the multifarious objects of knowledge and practical activity. And if we closely examine into the nature of beings, and the constitution of the Universe, such differences, far from surprising us, will appear as a necessary condition of this existence. Thus all men virtually possess the same faculties and instincts, all are endowed with the same natural aptitude for all social functions. But the unity of the Universe as well as the unity of human nature is divided into particular and individual beings, and split as it were into fragments; the necessary consequence of which division is that in some beauty, in others morality, most predominates; that one is possessed of a peculiar aptitude for mechanical labor, and another for some liberal or intellectual avocation. So it is with science. There is but one Science, as there is but one Intellect; and particular sciences constitute as many degrees, or stages, of the absolute Science. They are so many radii that spring from a central focus, from which they derive life, light, and nourishment. The natural philosopher who studies matter and its laws well knows that his investigations and results possess but a limited and relative importance, and are subordinate to a superior knowledge, where their justification and ultimate reason are only to be found. He knows it, or he ought to

know it. And if he be not aware of it—if, in consequence of a defective intellectual training he concentrates his attention and inquiries within the limited sphere of nature, seeking in it the ultimate solution of the problem of science, he is certainly mistaken in seeking the centre of knowledge where it is not to be found. Yet he thereby explicitly acknowledges that there is such a centre; he acknowledges, in other words, the existence and necessity of an absolute Science, and it is such a science he endeavors to realize. And so it would be with Mathematics and with any limited science that would set itself up as the ruling power of Intellect and as the Science of sciences. This high pretension would not be in keeping with the limited object of this investigation, but this would, at the same time, bear testimony to the existence of a higher object and a higher visual power than their own. Science and absolute Science are therefore, in the strict sense of the word, identical, and particular sciences are only sciences, inasmuch as they are parts of the absolute Science, coincide with, and are justified by it. Now, as there cannot be two Sciences, the second essential character of the really scientific knowledge is *unity*. The unity of Science is not the mathematical or *quantitative* unity, but the higher and *absolute* unity of *qualities* and *essences*, something like the unity of the human body, or the unity of the Universe*; namely, a whole in which the various qualities and essences, the conflicting elements, forces, and principles, are so harmoniously adjusted as to converge towards one and the same centre, and melt, as it were, into a common result; in other words, Science is essentially a *System*.

There are those who object to systematic knowledge on the plea that a system, i.e. a doctrine, which would be, so to

* This is an important distinction; for, misled by mathematical notions, we are apt to represent to ourselves the unity of things as an empty and abstract mathematical unity. But the unity of *force*, the unity of the *soul*, the unity of *God*, are neither *points* nor *numbers*, but are indivisible wholes, containing *quality* and *quantity* as well as the various attributes that constitute their nature. When we say that the soul is—that it possesses sensibility, will, intellect, &c., we *count* its attributes, and in this respect there is *quantity* in it; but the connection or unity of these *faculties* and *qualities* is not a *numerical* but an *essential* unity—the unity of the essence of the soul. Besides the unity of thought that *thinks*, and is all things, cannot be the mathematical unit. (See below ¶ 3. On *Thought*.)

speaking, the reflex of the Universe, embracing the universality of things, deducing and connecting them according to some rational process, describing their properties and nature, and determining the part they play either within their own limited sphere or in their relation to the whole, is well nigh, if not wholly, impossible. But the difficulty, however great it may be, we meet with in the realization of a scheme, is not a test against its rationality and usefulness; and because it is not an easy matter to realize a system, it does in no way follow that we must not make the attempt, if Science be, as it evidently is, a system. On the contrary, the consequence to be naturally drawn therefrom is, that the more systematic the investigation, the more accurate and complete the result. And it ought to be borne in mind, that the difficulty we find in realizing a perfect system may be said to beset all knowledge, the knowledge of the most rudimentary and minute object—of a pebble, of an insect—so that this argument belongs to the category of those which overshoot the mark, or, as logicians say, proving too much prove nothing. Indeed, if the matter be attentively inquired into, it will be seen that the difficulty in explaining the nature of particular beings chiefly arises from the absence of systematic knowledge, which precludes the mind from perceiving their connection with collateral beings and with the whole. For the part thus singled out and dis severed from the whole is not the same being as when connected with the whole. The eye which is separated from the body is no longer an eye but a dead and useless object; and the dissection and analysis of the anatomist, however careful and minute, is unable to reproduce the real eye, the eye that was in union with the whole organism, with life, with the mind, and through the mind with the Universe. The leaf which has fallen from the tree has ceased to be a leaf; and if we continue to call it so, it is from the remembrance of its former connection with the whole plant. But as soon as this connection is broken, its growth, its beauty, and all its other functions and purposes, are broken also. Thus it is with Science. Science which disconnects and scatters knowledge, and breaks asunder the unity of things—the golden chain from which the Universe is suspended—converts a full, concrete and living being into

an unmeaning, lifeless and purposeless object. Moreover, by admitting that Science is not a system, we admit that knowledge may be gathered at random, and that we are able to obtain it without deducing and disposing our thoughts and inquiries according to their natural and necessary connection—an opinion contradictory to the very notion of science, as well as to the universal nature of things, since nothing can either be rationally thought or exist which is not a system. The beauty, the proportion, the unity, we admire in the Universe is nothing else than a systematic arrangement—an arrangement which is not confined to the general outline and to the framework of the structure, but extends to all its parts and penetrates into its most minute details, thus filling alike the intellect and the imagination with wonder and delight. This applies equally to Science; for, whether Science be considered as the representation of the Universe, or the Universe as the representation of Science, the conclusion to be drawn, in either supposition, is that knowledge must be a system, and consequently that where there is no system there must be error, confusion, a medley of inordinate and irreconcilable elements. For to gather knowledge unsystematically is either to take up questions, notions and principles at random, without defining their nature, meaning and bearing,* or to consider a part as if it were a whole,† or the whole as if

* Thus it is, for instance, that we use the notion *infinite*, applying it indiscriminately to different objects, and saying that *God is infinite*; that *Space is infinite*; that *Number, Beauty, &c.* are *infinite*, without inquiring what an *infinite* being is or can be, nor how these various objects can be *infinite*. We deal in the same manner with other notions, and the most important, as *God, Force, Being, Object, &c.* For instance, we say, *God is a Being, Man is a Being, the Plant is a Being*, without inquiring into the meaning involved in the notion *Being*, or if it is the same notion which is applied to these different objects, and, if the same, how it can be applied to them.

† This is the way in which the different parts of Science are generally handled: Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, Psychology, Art, Religion, &c., are considered irrespectively of each other, and as if each of them constituted a whole. And within the province of each separate branch of knowledge, particular subjects are handled in the same manner. Hence exclusive, one-sided theories, as, for instance, in Psychological Science, the theory that deduces the whole mind from sensation; in Morals, the theories which identify all motives either with pleasure or with interest; in Art, the theories that concentrate beauty either in *form* or in *expression*; in Politics, all theories which, instead of embracing the various wants, tendencies and interests of the social body, single out some particular want or principle, and violently merge, as it were, the whole body politic into it.

it had no parts and could exist without them;* or to bring together things irreconcilable, and to separate things necessarily connected; or to confound things that are distinct by mixing their provinces, and forcing the nature of one upon that of the other;† or to admit or deny in a certain form the the very same things that had been denied or admitted in another.‡

We say, then, that absolute Science is *one*, and that it is one as a system.

But to know in the absolute sense of the word is not only to *think* and to *apprehend*, but to *be* the object of knowledge. In fact Science is neither *Thought* without *Being*, nor *Being* without *Thought*, as neither *Thought* which involves no real object, nor any real object which is not thought, constitute Science. Science is therefore the unity of thought and being—the object thought—or it is *Thought par excellence*, thought

* When, for instance, we say that the *cause* is perfect without its *effect*, or the *substance* without its *accidences*. Under the same head may be ranged those doctrines which strip a substance or a principle of its attributes, modes, or qualities—matter, for instance, of color, form, weight. &c.—the soul of sensibility, will, imagination, &c.—which they consider as *non-essential*. pretending that matter or the soul could exist without them; just as, in another province, some politicians would banish force, inequality, war from the State, which they consider as *unessential* elements of social life.

† This is one of the most common errors, as it is difficult to draw an exact line of demarcation between the various beings and spheres of existence. Thus it is that we transfer from one being or from one province of knowledge or existence to another the qualities, laws, and attributes, which belong only to the former. In this respect the inductive and analogical processes are the greatest source of inadvertencies and misconceptions.

‡ This inadvertency may be frequently observed in common life, where men will admit the very same proposal, opinion, and principle, they had formerly rejected, and which they would still reject unless it were put to them in a different form. Instances of the same error are not uncommon in science and in the most important questions. For instance, there are doctrines which draw an absolute separation between the substance of God and the substance of the world, and then when they come to determine the nature and attributes of the Godhead they realize them in conformity with our own, assigning to God our own faculties—a Personality, a Consciousness, a mode of loving and governing the world modelled upon our own corresponding attributes; so much so, that, according to this manner of viewing the subject, the popular dictum, that *man is made in the image of God*, ought to be reversed, and said that *God is made in the image of Man*. It will be observed that formal Logic is unable to supply any rule or criterion by the aid of which the mind could guard against these or other similar errors, as it is only by inquiring into the *matter* and objective nature of things that they can be discovered and avoided.

which is become adequate to its object, and in the nature of which the object has been so merged and absorbed as to make one and the same thing. The unity of the Universe is not to be found in the absolute *Being*, or in the absolute *Substance*, but in the absolute *Thought* and *Knowledge* in which the *Being* and the *Substance* as well as all other principles are involved, and attain their highest and fullest existence. *Being* and *Substance* without Science are like the body without the mind, or Nature without the Spirit.

We say, then, that *to know* is *to be*, and I will add that it is *to be* in the fullest acceptation of the word. The difficulty we find in perceiving the truth and importance of this principle is mainly due to a deficiency in the training of our speculative faculty, which keeps our mind within the bounds of sensation, of experience and induction, and conceals from its sight other and higher realities—realities without which experience itself, and all things appertaining to it, could neither exist nor be apprehended. In fact, if we start from experience,—holding it as the criterion of reality, the identity of *knowing* and *being*, is, I admit, inconceivable. For to apprehend a tree is not *to be* a tree, and to apprehend the fire is not *to be* the fire and to burn; so that here thought and its object are beings distinct and separable. But if we admit, as we must admit, that besides and above the visible and experimental there is an invisible and transcendent Reality, that this latter Reality is the principle of the former, and that, being beyond the reach of the senses, it can only be apprehended by pure thought—by thought freed from sensation and all experimental elements—the difficulty will be more easily solved.

To elucidate this point, let us consider the two propositions, *God is—This flower is*. Here, deceived by the identity of the word *is*, and by the habit of picturing to ourselves all reality in a material and sensible form, we apply to the word the same meaning in both instances, and thus are led to realize the *Being* of God as the *Being* of a flower or of any other object falling under the senses. Now, it may be easily perceived that the meaning involved in the *is* of the one proposition is entirely different, nay, the reverse of that which is involved in the *is* of the other. For the *Being* or the *to Be*

of God is not the *Being* of the flower, and were we to conceive His Being in any manner similar to that of an external and phenomenal object, not only would we distort but suppress at once the notion and existence of God. Consequently, when we say that God *is*, we mean, if we mean anything, that He *is* in a purely *intelligible* and *ideal* manner, and that He can be apprehended through that faculty which alone is able to reach the eternal and the absolute, by whatever name it be designated, whether it be called *Reason*, or *Intellect*, or *Speculative Thought*. Whence it follows also that the existence of God is quite the reverse of the existence of finite and phenomenal beings, and that, in order to form a correct notion of Him, we must strive to remove from our mind all trace of experience, and set its visual power, so to speak, in antagonism with it. And these considerations not only apply to God, but to all principles, causes, and essences. For neither God, nor any principle whatever, can be apprehended through experimental process, and it is only by a fallacy and delusion of the inductive method that we are led to believe that metaphysical science can be founded on experimental knowledge; it is from inconsistency, and by leaping over instead of filling up the gap—nay, by tacitly and unwittingly presupposing the very notion and principle it professes to draw from its operation—that experimental method concludes the infinite and eternal from the finite and temporal. Were it consistent, as phenomena, facts, effects—all, in one word, that comes within the pale of experience is changeable and perishable—the conclusion ought to be that principles, causes, and essences, are changeable and perishable also. Thus, for instance, as *motion*, *force*, *light*, *heat*, &c., when *considered* in particular phenomena, are continually perishing and reviving, the inference would be that the principles of these phenomena are subject to the same alternate movement of destruction and revival; or that the cause, whatever it be, that produces man is mortal, because man is mortal—and similar examples—which would be simply absurd, as nothing could be, nor be restored to life when destroyed, if its principles were liable either to alteration or destruction. Accordingly, the nature and knowledge—the Being and Knowing—of principles and essences, differ from the nature

and knowledge of their products—facts, phenomena, effects. And if we contrast the former with the latter we shall see, 1°. that, for the very reason that the former are the creative essences of things, their nature remains unimpaired and undiminished in the begetting of them; 2°. that they possess a *purely ideal and intelligible* nature,—indeed they are *ideas*, as we will see hereafter, and as such they cannot be *felt*, or brought within any sensuous shape, or any point of time and space, but only be apprehended by pure thought; 3°. that, from their being creative essences, they produce the effect without mingling their eternal and impassible nature with it, like the hand, or, still more truly, like the mind, that produces the work without being reacted upon by it and receiving the imprint of it; thus it is that Death destroys without destroying itself, and fire burns without burning itself out,* and 4°. that, because of their possessing a *pure* and *intelligible* nature, thought can think them in their intelligible existence—thinking the fire, for instance, the light, the air, as well as the Good, the Beautiful, &c., and when thinking them in their objective and essential nature, being the fire, the light, &c., &c., and keeping clear at the same time from their effects.

§ 3. On Thought.

This will be better understood if we give a deeper insight into the nature of Thought, of Science, and their eternal and inseparable object—namely, Ideas, and the relation in which they stand to each other.

To know is to think, and it is to think in the highest sense of the word. Now thought is not only the faculty from whose inexhaustible depths springs all knowledge, but it constitutes also the highest essence and the culminating point of existence. The old adage that man is a microcosm has only a meaning when applied to thought. For thought alone possesses the privilege, shared by no other faculty or being, of thinking itself and all other things, and of thinking them as within itself, and as objects not only cognate to, but identical with, its own nature. There is no being, whatever be its

* This elucidates the theory of the *First mover* of Aristotle, namely, of the *Mover* who moves All without moving itself, or being moved.

nature and properties, there is no point of space, actually or possibly, without the reach of thought. The infinite and the finite, the invisible and the visible world, the numberless variety of beings with their numberless qualities, difference and opposition, all equally meet in the depths of thought as in their common centre. Indeed it is in thought that the Universe attains its highest perfection. The external world, by being thought and in thought, is made partaker of a dignity, beauty, and perfection, it does not possess in itself. For it is *within* the mind that Nature attains its ideal and essential existence, whilst *without* the mind Nature's existence is fragmentary, scattered, destitute of inward bond or unity. It is an external juxtaposition of beings unconscious of themselves as well as of their mutual connection. Nor can we conceive, either in God or in man, anything more excellent than thought. Indeed it constitutes in both the very excellence of their nature.* In man, his whole being, so to speak, supposes thought, and is thought. Take away thought from him and he ceases to be what he is, the most wonderful amongst created beings, and he will find himself lowered to the level of the brute and inanimate creation. All his activity, internal as well as external, flows from thought; and there is no manifestation of it, from the most profound researches and the highest soarings of imagination to the most humble occupation, in which thought stands not foremost and is not the motive power of action. Will, imagination, memory, self-consciousness, and even the faculty that stands, as it were, on the limit of the physical and the spiritual worlds, of the body and soul—Sensation I mean—are not merely impelled by thought, but thought is their essential element—nay, they

* As far as we can conceive God. But this must not be lost sight of, namely, that God, like all other things, is only known to us through thought, and that beyond thought His being is for us = 0. It is one of the popular inadvertencies to believe that we can reach God through any other faculty—*sentiment. intuition,* or whatever be its name—but thought, although sentiment and intuition are only inferior forms of thought, or thought which is still mixed with sensation, and unable to perceive truth in its pure essence. We possess the sentiment of God as we possess the sentiment of ourselves, of mathematical truth, and of all things in general—which sentiment is a dim perception of these objects, or confused and imperfect thought, involving inconsistencies and delusion, a mixture of light and shade, of truth and error.

are different forms or instruments of thought. For there is thought in *Sensation* as well as in any other faculty and mental operation, and not only is it through thought that sensation is inwardly felt by the soul, but the external object that produces sensation is likewise apprehended by it. Thought constitutes, therefore, the unity of the human being, of mind and body, and of their connection with the universe*; and if it constitutes the highest essence and perfection, it follows that everything is made for it and is subordinate to it; that it is thought that will impart light, vigor and life to individuals as well as nations, and that where the internal activity of thought is declining there the external also will languish or become extinct. Such is thought, the most stupendous of beings! In the presence of Nature, before the huge masses that move in space, the vast expanse of the water, the sun and the planets, and the bodies innumerable with which the vault of heaven is studded, we are struck with wonder and awe. How much more will thought appear worthy of our admiration if we bear in mind, that not only these objects but the Universe is concentrated in thought,

* Those who place this unity in the brain as the centre of the nervous system, or those who *localize* the soul by assigning it a particular place, either in the brain, like Descartes (*glandula pinealis*), or in any other part of the body, are deceived by external and sensuous representation which lead them to assimilate the unity of the soul to something like the spider feeling in the centre of the cobweb the insect that skims over its threads. But quite different is the unity of the human being. Here the centre is everywhere and nowhere; and the sensation is not felt in a central point, but all over the body and in every part of it. Moreover, all sensation, however different and opposite—as the sensation of pain and pleasure, of light and darkness, of heat and cold, &c.—may be compared and brought into a unity, though felt by different senses and in different parts of the body. From the fact that we feel thinking in the brain, and that the more intense is thought, the more it seems to concentrate itself in this part of the body, it does not follow that thought has its seat in the brain, and much less that the brain is the faculty of thinking, but merely that the brain is the *main* instrument of thought, as the eye is the instrument of vision and the ear of hearing. I say the *main*; for all the senses and organs of the body are instruments of thought, as it is not the eye that *sees*, nor the ear that *hears*, but it is thought that sees and hears through the instrumentality of the organ. Besides, any theory attempting to explain the unity and nature of thought, or the unity and nature of the human being, by some organic function or arrangement, will run aground not only against abstract and speculative arguments, but against experience itself. For it is a fact that thought apprehends the infinite, the eternal, and the absolute, and consequently cannot be circumscribed within the bounds of corporeal organs.

and that the ultimate reason of all that exists and will exist is apprehended by thought, and is thought! For thought that constitutes the excellence of the human, constitutes also the excellence of the divine nature. God is the absolute and eternal thought. This is the highest definition of God, His preëminent attribute and perfection. The omnipotence, the love, the providence, as well as the goodness and justice of God are subordinate attributes and modes of His Being. All presuppose thought, and it is by coming, as it were, in contact with thought, that they attain their highest power and perfection. Thus the love of God is the thought of the eternal ideas which are His perfection, a love embracing the love of Himself and the love of the external manifestation of ideas, or the World; which shows that the love of God towards the world cannot be love towards individuals, nor even towards nations, but towards the Whole, and that the parts are only loved by God inasmuch as they harmonize with the Whole, and contribute to its preservation and the fulfilment of the law, which is the eternal thought of God. And thus it is that what is wisdom and love in the sight of man may be foolishness and hatred in the sight of God. This applies also to His Providence. The providence of God is His eternal and immutable thought, which is the law out of and according to which all things are made and governed. The government of the World is implied in the very essence of things, as everything must be made and governed according to its special essence. Therefore to *think* is in God to *govern* and to *foresee*, and to *govern through* and to *foresee* in the immutable essence of things. This is the rational notion of the Providence and Prescience of God, the only notion in conformity with the majesty and excellence of His nature. To realize God as actually foreseeing and regulating all single and daily events, all transient phenomena and accidents, is to degrade and lower Him to the level of finite beings.

NOTE.—The popular doctrine is that God not only governs the world through general laws, but that His Providence extends to all particular events, and to the minutest details of this vast and wonderful machinery. For it is agreed, if there were events—nay, one single event—that should not be predetermined by God, God's Providence would not embrace all things, and consequently God would not be All-powerful, which is contradictory to the notion of the Deity. The same

argument applies to His Prescience. Those who rest their doctrine on this and similar arguments do not perceive that they fall, and still more deeply, into the difficulty they pretend to avoid; for against this mode of arguing it may be retorted, that if it be contradictory to the notion of God that God's Providence should not embrace all things, it is much more at variance with the whole of His nature that He who is the Absolute and Perfect Being should busy Himself with individual beings and particular and transitory events, however unworthy they may be of His providential care. But we deal with God in a more off-hand way than we are wont to do with our fellow-creatures. For we would think it derogatory in the sovereign to descend from his high station and perform menial or inferior duties, or in the judge to carry out with his own hands the prescription of the law; but with God we are not so considerate and reverential, and He must have a hand in all our daily affairs, no matter how irreconcilable they may be with His majesty and perfections. And this is done to shield Him, as it were, from imperfection, and to describe Him in the fulness of His nature and existence! The fact is that such representation of God is sheer anthropomorphism; nay, it is the heathenish conception of the Deity, glossed over with a kind of nominal Spiritualism. For, in reality, we make Him love, foresee, and govern, as we do love, foresee, and govern; and we force upon Him what we call our Personality and Consciousness, adding, it is true, that all such attributes and faculties are *infinite* in Him, but taking care, at the same time, not to state what an *infinite* Love, an *infinite* Providence, an *infinite* Personality is or can be. In fact, if the matter were more closely gone into, it would become manifest that an *infinite* love, an *infinite* personality, &c., are mere vain and empty words, calculated only to mislead the mind, if we realize God's love and personality like man's. The heathenish representation of God would then be at least more consistent. For if love in God be what love in man is, God must love as man does; and if God's government of the Universe be what man's government is, Jupiter must convene his council in Olympus as Agamemnon in the camp, and frown when in anger, and drink and eat as man does when impelled by thirst and hunger, except that he will partake of some unknown and immortal nourishment. And what is still stranger in the matter is, that if any one come forward and suggest that these and the like representations of God—namely, all representations drawn from experience, analogy, and induction—are not only inadequate, but fallacious and at variance with the very nature of God; and that the only way by which we can form a correct and true notion of the Deity is through purely intellectual and speculative processes, as God is not only a Being that no experimental process can reach, but rather the reverse of all we know through experience;—if any one, I say, come forward and hold such a doctrine, some will object that they do not understand it, and that it is too subtle for their perception; others, that they have neither leisure nor taste for such inquiries, and that they rest satisfied with the popular and current notions on the matter; and finally, others, that all speculation is the delusion of a visionary brain that mistakes its own phantoms for realities, not unfrequently exciting against it popular ignorance and prejudice by branding it with the name of Pantheism, of Atheism and Infidelity. Surely, if there be Atheism and Infidelity, all doctrine that inculcates an irrational and erroneous notion of the Godhead deserves such a name; and if there be Pantheism, the doctrine that teaches that God predetermines and foresees everything, and that there is not a single event in which God has not a share, is Pantheism of the coarsest description. That God is All, and that all things are in God, is a sound—nay, it is the only rational doctrine. For all things must come from God, if they do not come from nought; but if they come

from God, were they even created *ex nihilo*, there must be something of God—a spark of the divine essence—in them. Consequently, those who hold that God is in the World, and that the World is in God, hold a rational tenet. In fact, this parental connexion of God with the World is that which, on the one hand, imparts to the World and to everything that is in it whatever being and perfection they possess, and which, on the other hand, completes, as it were, the perfection of God Himself. For if we separate, substantially and absolutely, God and the World, we do not only impair and curtail the being of the World but that of God also. We curtail the being of the World, by separating it from its principle; we curtail the being of God, by admitting that the substance of the World is independent of God, and, consequently, by admitting two absolute substances. And the *creatio ex nihilo* would not fill up the gap, as the *creatio ex nihilo* could not affect the principles and essences of things, which under any supposition, must be coeternal with God. But if God be All, He is not so in the sense that He is every individual being and every single phenomenon—so that if I am joyful or sorrowful He should rejoice and grieve with me, or that He should be the insect that crawls or the seed that grows upon the earth—but in the sense that He is the principle of all things, and that all things find their ultimate reason, their essence, in Him. Thus, being the principle, He is not what the thing is of which He is the principle. And, being All in this high sense of the word, He is not what the individual and fragmentary part is. It is because joy and sorrow, as well as life and death, come from Him, that He does neither rejoice nor grieve, neither come to life nor end in death. For should He come to life or end in death He could give neither life nor death; and if He felt joy and sorrow as we do He could be the principle of neither, as they would be sent to Him as they are sent to us. Besides, being All and the Absolute, He is liable neither to want, nor loss, nor to any increase of perfections, which are the conditions of joy and sorrow and of all similar modifications and changes through which the finite and mortal being must pass. Again, the seed that becomes and the seed that is (the essence) are two different seeds. The former we see and touch, the latter we think only. But that which we think only, is eternal and immortal. God is the *Thought*, the *Idea*, the *Essence* of the Universe—this is the highest and absolute definition of God, a definition in which are comprised His Providence, His Love, His Power, and all His perfections. For the Thought of God is the Providence of things, and, for the very reason it is the essence, it is the Providence of each being particularly. The Providence of the plant is its *idea*, according to which it is born, it grows and dies. And so it is with everything. And, knowing and being the *idea*, God need not extend His care to individual beings, as not only the knowledge and being of the latter are involved in the knowledge and being of the former, but they find in the former their highest and perfect existence. Thus, for instance, in the knowledge and being of the ideal triangle are comprised all material triangles, whatever be their size, form, and position, as in the knowledge and being of the ideal man—genus or species—are involved the knowledge and being of all men. Consequently, it must be laid down as a fundamental principle of metaphysical science that God is in the World, and that He is not in the World; that He is All things in their *idea*, and as a Whole, and in the Unity of their existence; and that He is not All things individually, or in their particular and fragmentary existence.

ON HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHIC METHOD.

To Hegel has been ascribed the honor of discovering a new Philosophic Method. In the Introduction to his great central work, "The Logic," Hegel himself claims that although the method which he has "followed in that book—or rather the method which the system itself has followed—may be capable of much improvement, or more thoroughness of elaboration, as regards details, yet I know that it is the only true method." "Because," he adds, "it is identical with its object and content; for it is the content in itself, the Dialectic which it has in itself that constitutes its evolution." "The only thing essentially necessary to an insight into the method of scientific evolution is a knowledge of the logical nature of the negative; that it is positive in its results,—in other words, that its self-contradiction does not result in zero or the abstract nothing, but rather in the negation of its special content only; that such negation is not simple [or absolute] negation, but the negation of a definite object which annuls itself, and is therefore a definite negation. Hence in the result there is contained essentially that from which it resulted—which amounts to a tautology, for otherwise the somewhat would be an independent original existence and not a result."

If we restate his method and affirm it to be the process of discovering in the finite or limited what it is that constitutes its limitation or finitude, and thereby of ascending through successive syntheses to the self-limited or infinite, we shall see in that statement its substantial identity with the Platonic Dialectic. To trace out the dependent to that on which it depends is to go from the part to the whole, from that which is not self-existent to that which is self-existent. (Plato's definition we shall quote below.)

The triad—Being, Naught, and Becoming—with which Hegel begins his Logic furnishes an example of an application of the general method as well as an exhibition of what is peculiarly Hegelian. In consideration of the fact that this triad is better known than anything else of Hegel, and that it has furnished the point of attack to his most powerful

opponents—Trendelenburg in particular*—an exposition of his method in the evolution of this triad will serve to exhibit the true nature of the Hegelian Philosophy more directly than any general disquisition on its results.

Let us at once, then, proceed to grapple with this much disputed beginning of Hegelian Logic, and make, *first*, an abstract exposition of the theme; *second*, a more concrete or explanatory one; *third*, a critical one, directed towards the position of Trendelenburg. We will attempt to give Hegel's thought in our own manner.

I. Abstract Exposition.

A. *Introduction: why we begin with the category of Being.*

Whatever we postulate as a beginning of pure science must be, as such, not yet scientifically determined. It is the object of pure science to develop a system, and of course the beginning cannot be a system. Since in pure science we must not receive determinations (attributes, qualities, categories, definitions, logical terms, &c.) except those justified and defined by the system, any determination that *we* postulate, and that is not objectively evolved, must be regarded as unscientific and therefore rejected. Determination and negation are identical, and the complete removal of determination or negation should give us pure being as a beginning or starting-point of our system. Were our system to start with any other category, as for example with the Ego, that category must be as empty as pure being; if not, it would contain pure being plus determinations, and thus duality would be present before the system had evolved it. It would be ostensibly seized as a simple somewhat, and yet the mind would *mean* something else more concrete. Science has to do with what is *expressed* and not with what is merely *meant*. Hence, unless Science is to start unscientifically, it must commence with pure Being.

B. *Being: what comes of the pure thought of it.*

- I. Being is the simple undetermined.
- II. Since it is the not-determined, it is distinguished from the determined, and is already determined by the con-

* *Logische Untersuchungen.*

trast. (The abstraction from the world of concrete being here becomes explicit.)

- III. But since according to its definition (I.) it is the absolutely undetermined, it must be the negative of all determined somewhats, and hence of itself, if it is determined through contrast. It is therefore negative of itself as Being, if Being be defined at all as contrasted. Such a universal negative may be named, substantively, Naught.

Remark.—Here we have I. its definition, whence results II. its opposition or contrast, III. its self-relation. Thought endeavors to seize the object (Being) as a whole, i.e. to comprehend it in its entirety. It seizes first the abstract definition, and then proceeds to realize it as thus defined. It finds contrast, and then further, universal negation as the more adequate statement of the idea which it is contemplating.

C. Naught: the result of attempting to think it purely.

- I. Being can comply with its definition—which requires it to be kept distinct from its determination or negation—only by negating itself and thus becoming *Naught*. Naught is the negative of all Being.
- II. Naught as the negative of all Being is defined through contrast: it is distinguished from Being.
- III. But since Naught is the negation of all Being, it is the negative of itself; for if Being were regarded as the determined, Naught would be the undetermined, and hence the negative of itself as the opposite of Being (i.e. contrasted with Being); or, if Being is defined as the undetermined, then Being becomes universal negation, and Naught as the negation of Being must be the negation of universal negation or negation of itself.

Resumé.—The thought of Being is the thought of a vanishing, a negation of itself. It is hence a form of Becoming. But the thought of Naught is the thought of a self-negation or a determining of itself, hence the thought of origination or beginning to be. Naught can be thought, therefore, only as a form of Becoming. Origination (beginning) and evanescence (ceasing) are the two forms of Becoming. Becoming is the thought which results from thinking Being and Naught.

D. *Becoming: Results from trying to think the All as a Becoming.*

- I. Becoming in general is a union of Being and Naught, but a union wherein their difference vanishes and each passes into the other. The difference must persist, and likewise the annulling of that difference must persist, or else the Becoming will cease.
- II. The union of Being and Naught in the Becoming is a union wherein each is a self-annulment. Not Being nor Naught in their simple abstraction, but each a vanishing—the former as Ceasing, the latter as Beginning. Being and Naught have proved themselves no adequate categories, but in their places we have two forms of Becoming.
- III. Becoming considered by itself is a self-nugatory, for it implies duality and involves a *from* and a *to*; but not from *Being* to *Naught* nor the contrary, but from Beginning to Ceasing, and the contrary; for the difference that remains in the Becoming is that between the two kinds of Becoming only. Beginning likewise, as a form of Becoming, possesses duality and is a *from* and *to*, but for the reason stated can have in itself only the difference of the two forms of Becoming, and hence contains within it its own opposite; Ceasing, too, contains in itself its opposite in so far as it is Becoming. Hence the difference upon which Becoming rests also vanishes, and each side becomes identical through its evolution of its opposite from itself. Thus instead of Becoming we have rather determined (or definite) Being. Each form of Becoming is a process that returns into itself through its opposite, and by this each becomes the total process, and the total process is a present unity of Being and Naught or of Beginning and Ceasing.

Note.—The “*from* and *to*” involved in Becoming is not a spatial one. If Spatial, then we have a concrete form of Becoming, to wit, motion. But Becoming involves only beginning and ceasing, and this applies as well to ideas as to natural things, and hence includes spatial motion under it as one species distinct and separate from the activity of thinking as another species. All spatial motion is measured in feet or decimals of a foot, but ideas do not admit of such measurement, and the activity of passing from one to another is therefore non-spatial.

Remark.—This deduction will seem wholly arbitrary and a mere play of words to most people. All exposition of

pure thought—that in Plato's *Parmenides*, for example—seems arbitrary word-jugglery.

Let us go over the ground once more in a more explanatory and familiar manner, when some of the difficulties may clear up.

II. Explanatory Exposition.

BEING AND NAUGHT.

I wish to know the truth—to think it; and by truth I mean the abiding, that which is universally and necessarily valid, and all that is involved in it.

How shall I begin? I wish to think the truth, the abiding, that which must be as it is and can be nothing else. Hence I am to find the universal conditions of Being; and these universal conditions must result from Being itself as its nature. Let me think Being then and see what else is implied.

If I think Being as self-sufficing, I do not set it opposite to Naught as something else than it, for thus it would receive distinction or determination through this very contrast. I must think Being by itself; as excluding all multiplicity, for the multiple can be only where there is distinction of parts, and distinction is negation or Not-being. Hence if I would not let in the opposite of Being (or Non-being) into my thought of the same, I must think being as simple and undetermined; otherwise it will be a self-contradiction—it will be a being that contains negation or limitation already.

Having now before me the thought of pure simple Being, let me examine it. What is pure simple Being? It is—undetermined; it has no content; it is—Naught. It cannot differ from Naught; for if it did, it would differ by means of some characteristic or determination, and this would render its simple pure Being, determined Being. I think pure Being, therefore, as identical with Naught when I think it by itself. "It at once becomes its opposite"? No, it does not become its opposite; it *is* Naught, and does not seem *to become* it. Let me pause, however, and consider the result at which I have arrived. For it is clear that in trying to seize Being purely by itself, and without negation or limitation, I have arrived at a dead result identical with Naught. I set out with the resolve to think Being pure and simple, and even with-

out opposition or contrast. But by removing all difference from it I get only Naught as a result. I must, however, investigate this result and see what implications my thought of it contains.

What do I mean by the thought of Naught? It is the thought of the negation of All—a negation by itself, for I am considering each category by itself, as a universal. It is the negation of all, and yet is all. But as such it is a negation of itself. Either it is a negation which does not negate anything, or it is a negation that negates itself. It is the content of its own negation. At all events, the thinking of negation in the universal form of Naught gives as result the cancelling of negation.

Here we are arrived at a very strange view. At first, Being seemed identical with Naught without Becoming,—two names for one concept; now, Naught has shown itself to involve self-opposition; it is inherently antithetic, and posits distinction or difference instead of identity. It therefore posits duality, and the duality of Being and Naught rises before us as an immediate distinction which cannot be resolved into any other or more simple one. Being and Naught are opposites and contradictories, and yet are this only when in one unity. If we try to seize them isolatedly each becomes the opposite of itself, and each has no truth or meaning outside of the synthetic thought which unites them.

Note.—A psychological question arises: Why is not the absolute Naught, the *Nihil negativum*, entirely outside of all relation or contrast, and hence, no “negation of all”? It is made relative by thinking it as active negation. It seems, therefore, an assumption to pass from “naught” to “negation of all”—an unwarrantable substitution, a *petitio principii*. Of course, so soon as one can see Naught to be a self-negation, the dialectical self-movement must be apparent. Hegel has omitted any notice of this point in treating of Being, Naught, or Becoming, but has elucidated the question in its proper place under “*Reflexion*” (vol. ii. of the large Logic) and also under “*Begriff*” (vol. iii. of the same). In the third or critical exposition of this subject, which follows, an endeavor will be made to clear up this point.

BECOMING.

If I review my result, it is this: my thought of Being is a thought of the becoming of Naught—a ceasing to be, a de-

parting, an evanescence. My thought of Naught is a thought of the becoming of Being—a beginning to be, an arising or origination. These I perceive are two species of Becoming, and they exhaust the genus. These appear distinct, and their distinction is the distinction which I formerly supposed I saw between Being and Naught, but which proved on examination to be really a distinction between these two kinds of Becoming. I note also that Becoming cannot be a becoming of Naught or of Being, for each of these latter categories has shown itself to be in reality a species of Becoming.

Is this distinction between the two forms of Becoming a true and abiding one? Is Becoming the “solvent word” which explains the All?

Let me examine this distinction more closely: the Becoming is a duality, it is a *from* and a *to*: a union of distinct somewhats in the process of uniting. Ceasing is *from* Being *to* Naught; Beginning is *from* Naught *to* Being. Becoming is the term indifferently applied to either. But Ceasing cannot become Naught, for the thought of pure Naught showed it to be a self-dirempting, a Beginning. Hence Ceasing can only cease in Beginning. Beginning cannot become Being, for pure Being is a self-nugatory whose more adequate statement is Ceasing. Hence Beginning is a movement towards Ceasing, inseparable from it, and therefore no simple pure species of Becoming, but rather a movement that is at once “reflected into itself.” Beginning is a movement from itself to Ceasing which is a movement to Beginning. Each species of Becoming has the other species as its own content. Each process traced out is a becoming of itself through the becoming of its other. Beginning becomes Ceasing, which, again, becomes Beginning. Such a process to itself through its other has been called “Reflection into itself.”

The form of Reflection into itself cannot be considered as a Becoming. Its form is that of self-relation. Each of its sides is reflected into itself through the other, and hence each is identical with the other. Each is itself *plus* the other in one process. Becoming can persist only so long as the inequality or non-identity of the two sides persists. The becoming of the same from the same is no becoming; it is rather an unchangeable continuance of one phase.

I must, therefore, seek another name, since Becoming is no longer an appropriate predicate for the All. Being and Naught were no adequate designations of the All; they were mere phases of the process of Becoming. The phases Beginning and Ceasing vanish in more comprehensive processes. Instead of Being, Naught, or Becoming, I have before me the thought of the Determining of Being: two forms of self-relation, Being or Ceasing returning into itself through Naught or Beginning, and the opposite of this, i.e. Naught reflected into itself through Being. Here is Determination: determined Being and determined Naught. The abyss of difference that yawned for me between Being and Naught is now narrowed to that between Reality and Negation, the two forms of determined Being. Each is a form of Being, for each begins and ends with itself, i.e. has the form of self-sufficiency, and not the form of dependence or of relation to another.

Remark 1.—We note that the Dialectic movement carries with it two threads which are ever becoming identical in a new Category. Thus at first our two threads were Being and Naught; next, Beginning and Ceasing, whose general name is Becoming; then, again, Reality and Negation, the sides of Determined Being. These two threads become identical in the respect wherein they were first distinguished, and this their identity is a new Category. But their distinction reappears in the new Category, as a less essential one.

Remark 2.—Upon inspection of the Dialectic movement one will see that it is not a method of proceeding from a first principle “which continues to remain valid”—as, e.g., some mathematical axiom. One is rather engaged in a process of proving his first principles to be untrue or inadequate, and is leaving them behind him as abstract untrue elements and arriving at comparatively concrete and true ones. Each new category is richer in what it contains than the preceding, for it is a unity resulting from a synthesis of what has gone before.

Remark 3.—Thus the dialectical procedure is a retrograde movement from error back to truth, from the abstract and untrue back to the concrete and true; from the finite and dependent back to the Infinite and Self-subsistent. We are proceeding toward a First Principle rather than from one.

In Plato's Republic, book vii., chapter xiii. (*Stallbaum*), a clear distinction is drawn between the Dialectic Method (*ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος*) of pure science (*ἐπιστήμη*), which

cancels one after the other its hypothetical categories or principles on its way to the highest principle (τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναρροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν), and Geometry with its kindred sciences, which use fixed hypotheses or axioms (ἕως ἂν ὑποθέσῃσι χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἔωσι, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον δίδοναι αὐτῶν) and are not able to deduce them. Thus our hypothetical "Being," "Naught," &c., have been removed on our way to the first principle.

Remark 4.—We do not lose any of our categories, but only reduce them to subordinate elements ("moments"). The unity wherein they are thus annulled is called a "Negative Unity."

Remark 5.—Hegel's logic in this manner proceeds to show up one after another all the general ideas or categories of thought, finding for each the exact place in the series which its extension and comprehension gives it. The highest and ultimate is the IDEA as definition of Personality—the self-conscious Absolute, the νόησις νοήσεως which Aristotle finds to be the highest, and which Theology defines as God.

Before arriving at this point such questions have arisen as :

- (1) Is not all this a play on words?
- (2) If not a play on words, is it not merely a subjective play of thought, and not in anywise a process related to objective truth?
- (3) Do you not in every instance presuppose concrete categories (movement, for example) as underlying the pure thoughts with which the dialectic begins?
- (4) If you were really to begin without presuppositions, could you find any language into which to translate your results? Do you not in fact merely translate one set of categories into another set not scientifically deduced?

In order to clear up these and a multitude of other similar objections which have no answer in the foregoing expositions the following considerations are presented. Those acquainted with the objections of Trendelenburg and others will perhaps see their pertinence best.

III. Critical Exposition.

A. "The presuppositionless Beginning."

1. That Pure Science should begin without presupposition means that it should begin with an idea that is not analytically resolvable into simpler ones. If the idea with which we begin involves others simpler than it, we should discover ourselves in the act of thinking those simpler presuppositions while on our way to think the beginning; that is to say, if we turned our attention fully upon our unconscious processes.

Our attempted beginning would be a farce, for we should at once repudiate it: our first thinking would result in detecting the ideas implicit in it, and from these elements we should make a new commencement.

2. In science all should be explicit, or should become so. A term should not *mean* more than it is defined to mean. But when we claim that Pure Science should begin without assuming results implicitly contained in some synthetic idea, we do not mean that Pure Science does not imply or presuppose—(a) that the philosopher who is to understand it must have ideas and names for them; (b) that his progress will consist in recognizing, in the Pure Science, ideas before familiar to him and known by name. He will learn in Pure Science to know their necessity, scope, and affiliation. A familiar unscientific knowledge goes before a scientific one. The description of the categories of Pure Science must at the beginning be made by means of terms not yet dialectically examined. Trendelenburg criticizes Hegel (*Logische Untersuchungen*, 2^o. *Auflage*, p. 37 sqq.) for using the expression “unity” in speaking of the “unity of Being and Naught in the Becoming.” It was a presupposition surreptitiously brought in where all presupposition was expressly excluded. So, too, he points out the expression “pure abstraction,” and more especially the idea of “movement” where Hegel says of Being and Naught, “Their truth is therefore this *movement* of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: Becoming, &c.” The idea of movement, says Trendelenburg, “is the vehicle of the dialectic evolution in thought.”

Here is a misunderstanding of the sense in which presupposition is applied. Trendelenburg would demand strictly that Pure Science should, according to Hegel, generate not only its ideas from the *à priori* activity of thought, but also the names and predicates applied to them. He would prohibit any recognition of any determinations that arose in thought, for recognition would imply that the ideas were known before in some shape, and hence were presupposed and not originated. Such a demand completely stultifies all pure science inasmuch as the latter sets out with the express problem before it of deducing the content of experience, or at least the form of experience, and every result in pure science

must consequently be an identification (act of recognition) of its *à priori* determinations with the content of experience. Only in this way could science explain anything by exhibiting its origin and necessity.

3. It can, however, be reasonably asked of pure science that it shall at its close leave no category of pure thought undeduced. Each category must exhibit what ideas it presupposes as its elements or moments analytically contained in it, as well as what ideas it demands either to complement its defects, or to transcend and include it in a higher totality. But science cannot deduce all ideas at once. Its beginning must be made with the simplest idea and the others must be introduced in the order of their complexity. Pure science cannot be said to be complete until it explains and deduces the simple idea with which it began. It must be a circle.

4. We may call thinking finite so long as it is involved with a content foreign to itself—i.e. with some matter of Experience derived from the senses. Through the act of Reflection (in the form of analysis and abstraction) thought steps back from the world of Experience and contemplates its own generalizations or abstractions. The *summum genus* of such generalization is Being. When it abstracts from all multiplicity and says all things in the world are, or have Being, Being is contemplated as the ultimate result of analysis. Thought has cut off one by one all special determinations (properties, characteristics, attributes, predicates), and now has before it the empty form of itself: of itself, because experience gave only the multiplicity, and analysis has eliminated it all. Being is therefore the empty form of pure thought from which all content has been removed. It is justly considered a great era for Philosophy when the Eleatics announced Being as the highest principle. It was the first time that a Philosophy had announced a pure thought for its principle. Neither Pythagoras nor Heraclitus did this explicitly. When thought becomes its own object it assumes the form of the infinite; i.e. it is no longer limited by and dependent on an external object, but is self-limited and independent, in its cognition.

5. Being is the limit of Analytic thinking. How does thought become synthetic and find its way back to concrete

Categories? Simply by extending its consciousness into self-consciousness. In reflection it is conscious of the object and of its negative power of abstraction. In the speculative activity of thought it must objectify its entire activity and observe it. In sense-perception only the object is known, and no notice is taken of the function performed by thought in furnishing the general ideas through which we recognize the object. In reflection we recognize the general ideas as the basis of the particular. In the speculative we must cognize the primitive synthesis of Reason which makes it possible. Reflection, therefore, always recognizes only dead results. It fails to grasp the synthetic movement that takes place unconsciously in the mind, as its counterpart.

B. The Dialectic: how synthesis arises from analysis.

6. Being is defined as the undetermined. Abstraction has removed all determinations in order to seize Being purely. But if we now try to seize Being and realize its definition in thought, we come upon this contradiction: it is defined as indefinite. When we attempt to seize Being as the negative of all, we seize it as determined and defined by this negative attitude. We correct this act of determination and limitation of the idea of Being by recurrence to the definition of indeterminateness, and hence we think it as negative to itself as thus defined and limited. It flees itself. We thus find our thought of Being an infinite regress: first we apply a predicate to it, but we immediately annul the predicate on account of its inconsistency; we continue to annul its predicates, but the act of annulling them is the act of predicating them. Predicatelessness is itself a predicate, and to think without the act of predication is impossible. Hence our thinking activity necessarily posits a self-negative idea when it posits Pure Being. It posits a regress *ad infinitum*: a vanishing; an idea which perpetually finds itself in opposition and thus has become a particular, and therefore annuls itself and escapes beyond itself. It is a self-remover, a self-negative. It must flee all particular, i.e. retire to the extreme of simplicity; but thus it goes into self-contradiction, for it should be pure from all relations or antitheses, and hence pure from purity.

But such a thought is no longer simply analytic, but an active synthesis—the thought of self-determination or self-annulment.

7. Self-annulment of Being is a form of Becoming. In our synthetic act as the totality of the thought of Being, we have Becoming in both forms. As Being it is a self-cancelling—ceasing-to-be. But it is just as much an act of opposition or antithesis in itself, and hence a specializing or particularizing of itself, a becoming of something or a beginning-to-be. Thus it is an activity of determining itself while in the act of annulling determinations; and vice versa. This remarkable result we have arrived at only through observing our whole thought, its process as well as its results. Reflection noted results; the speculative thought notes processes as well.

8. Becoming is then the more adequate name of the object of pure thought as it is now before us. But it is Becoming as a process which unites two counter activities each of which is a becoming. A tendency *to*, and a tendency *from*, are the extremes of its activity. But each of these extremes is likewise dual, and sustains itself only through its opposite. The Ceasing (or self-annulment of Being) is only an activity of self-opposition by which it reduces its simple empty being to a definite particular—and thus it is a Beginning. But it is the latter only in so far as it is an active cancelling of such opposition and particularization. Hence we now see that our activity is a circular one and returns back into itself continually. Becoming is therefore now seen to be no adequate designation of the synthesis before us. It is a self-sustained process of determination (called by Hegel *Daseyn*) which we may call determined Being.

We can proceed further to examine the adequacy of our new designation and trace out its synthesis of the two counter movements which we recognized in it as (a) Beginning returning into itself through Ceasing, and (b) Ceasing returning into itself through Beginning.

This is enough, however, to show the critical basis of Hegel's method, and to furnish a key to the insight into the difference between its procedure and that of the Analytical Reflection. Plato's "Knowing by wholes" (i.e. knowing the results in their entire process) has here its explanation.

C. *Pure Thought objective as well as subjective.*

9. We now will inquire briefly what are the grounds of the assertion that this pure thought has objective validity and furnishes the key to the explanation of the world of Experience.

Pure thought is the universal and necessary form of thought and hence the net result of all thought. What is found in pure thought is the thought which underlies all concrete thinking. Pure thought brings to consciousness the whole process, while in ordinary thinking we know only the results of our thinking activity, and not only can give no account of the process within us, but for the most part never suspect the existence of such a process. We refer the results of the unconscious dialectic process within us to an objective origin.

Thought exhibits its process exhaustively in pure science. Hence it would be as impossible to think of an objective existence which transcended the categories of pure thought as it would be to think without thinking. Any special act of thought can be analyzed at once, and the pure thought which lies at its basis exhibited. The possibility of all special thinking lies primarily in pure thinking.

Not only is it impossible to think or express anything that transcends the categories of pure thought, but the speculative insight is certain of the universal and necessary objective validity of what it recognizes as the total process of the thinking activity. It is perfectly certain that what it finds true of quantity in general can never be untrue of quantity in particular. For the thought of any particular quantity is limited by the thought of quantity in general. So of Cause and Effect, of Substance, Essence, Design, &c. When we determine *a priori* a mathematical theorem we are perfectly certain that we can never experience its opposite in Space or Time. For it is the logical condition of the existence of phenomena in Time and Space. So pure thought is the logical condition of all thought, and hence no one can ever cognize an experience other than through it and in accordance with it.

10. In fancy or imagination our thinking activity exhibits its arbitrariness and caprice, and hence in them we do not

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PEDAGOGICS AS A SYSTEM.

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THIRD PART.**Particular Systems of Education.****SECOND DIVISION.****THE SYSTEM OF THEOCRATIC EDUCATION.**

§ 227. The system of National Education founded its first stage on the substantial basis of the family-spirit; its second stage on the division of the nation by means of division of labor which it makes permanent in castes; its third stage presents the free opposition of the laity and clergy; in its next phase it makes war, immortality, and trade, by turns, its end; thirdly, it posits beauty, patriotic youth, and the immediateness of individuality, as the essence of mankind, and at last dissolves the unity of nationality in the consciousness that all nations are really one since they are all human beings. In the intermixture of races in the Roman world arises the conception of the human race, the *genus humanum*. Education had become eclectic: the Roman legions levelled the national distinctions. In the wavering of all objective morality, the necessity of self-education in order to the formation of character appeared ever more and more clearly; but the conception, which lay at the foundation, was always, nevertheless, that of Roman, Greek, or German education. But in the midst of these nations another system had striven for development, and this did not base itself on the natural connection of nationality, but made this, for the first time, only a secondary thing, and made the direct relation of man to God its chief idea. In this system God himself is the teacher. He manifests to man His will as law, to which he must unconditionally conform for no other reason than that He is the Lord, and man His servant, who can have no other will than His. The obedience of man is therefore, in this system, abstract until through experience he gradually attains to the knowledge that the will of God has in it the very essence

of his own will. Descent, Talent, Events, Work, Beauty, Courage,—all these are indifferent things compared with the subjection of the human to the divine will. To be well-pleasing to God is almost the same as belief in Him. Without this identity, what is natural in national descent is of no value. According to its form of manifestation, Judaism is below the Greek spirit. It is not beautiful, but rather grotesque. But in its essence, as the religion of the contradiction between the idea and its existence, it goes beyond nature, which it perceives to be established by an absolute, conscious, and reasonable Will; while the Greek concealed from himself only mythically his dependence on nature, on his mother-earth. The Jews have been preserved in the midst of all other culture by the elastic power of the thought of God as One who was free from the control of nature. The Jews have a patriotism in common with the Romans. The Maccabees, for example, were not inferior to the Romans in greatness.

—Abraham is the genuine Jew because he is the genuinely faithful man. He does not hesitate to obey the horrible and inhuman command of his God. Circumcision was made the token of the national unity, but the nation may assimilate members to itself from other nations through this rite. The condition always lies in belief in a spiritual relation to which the relation of nationality is secondary. The Jewish nation makes proselytes, and these are widely different from the *Socii* of the Romans or the *Metœci* of the Athenians.—

§ 228. To the man who knows Nature to be the work of a single, incomparable, rational Creator, she loses independence. He is negatively freed from her control, and sees in her only an absolute means. As opposed to the fanciful sensuous intuitions of Ethnicism, this seems to be a backward step, but for the emancipation of man it is a progress. He no longer fears Nature but her Lord, and admires Him so much that prose rises to the dignity of poetry in his telological contemplation. Since man stands over and beyond nature, education is directed to morality as such, and spreads itself out in innumerable limitations, by means of which the distinction of man from nature is expressly asserted as a difference.* The ceremonial law appears often arbitrary, but in its

prescriptions it gives man the satisfaction of placing himself as will in relation to will. For example, if he is forbidden to eat any specified part of an animal, the ground of this command is not merely natural—it is the will of the Deity. Man learns therefore, in his obedience to such directions, to free himself from his self-will, from his natural desires. This exact outward conformity to subjectivity is the beginning of wisdom, the purification of the will from all individual egotism.

—The rational substance of the Law is found always in the Decalogue. Many of our modern, much admired authors exhibit a superficiality bordering on shallowness when they comment alone on the absurdity of the miracles, and abstract from the profound depth of the moral struggle, and from the practical rationality of the ten commandments.—

§ 229. Education in this theocratical system is on one side patriarchal. The Family is very prominent, because it is considered to be a great happiness for the individual to belong from his very earliest life to the company of those who believe in the true God. On its other side it is hierarchical, as its ceremonial law develops a special office, which is to see that obedience is paid to its multifarious regulations. And, because these are often perfectly arbitrary, Education must, above all, practise the memory in learning them all, so that they may always be remembered. The Jewish monotheism shares this necessity with the superstition of ethnicism.

§ 230. But the technique proper of the mechanism is not the most important pedagogical element of the theocracy. We find this in its historical significance, since its history throughout has a pedagogical character. For the people of God show us always, in their changing intercourse with their God, a progress from the external to the internal, from the lower to the higher, from the past to the future. Its history, therefore, abounds in situations very interesting in a pedagogical point of view, and in characters which are eternal models.

§ 231. (1) The will of God as the absolute authority is at first to them, as law, external. But soon God adds to the command to obedience, on one hand, the inducement of a promise of material prosperity, and on the other hand the

threat of material punishment. The fulfilment of the law is also encouraged by reflection on the profit which it brings. But, since these motives are all external, they rise finally into the insight that the law is to be fulfilled, not on their account, but because it is the will of the Lord; not alone because it is conducive to our happiness, but also because it is in itself holy, and written in our hearts: in other words, man proceeds from the abstract legality, through the reflection of eudæmonism, to the internality of moral sentiment—the course of all education.

—This last stand-point is especially represented in the excellent Gnostic of Jesus Sirach—a book so rich in pedagogical insight, which paints with master-strokes the relations of husband and wife, parents and children, master and servants, friend and friend, enemy and enemy, and the dignity of labor as well as the necessity of its division. This priceless book forms a side-piece from the theocratic stand-point to the *Republic* of Plato and his laws on ethical government.—

§ 232. (2) The progress from the lower to the higher appeared in the conquering of the natural individuality. Man, as the servant of Jehovah, must have no will of his own; but selfish naturalness arrayed itself so much the more vigorously against the abstract "Thou shalt," allowed itself to descend into an abstraction from the Law, and often reached the most unbridled extravagance. But since the Law in inexorable might always remained the same, always persistent, in distinction from the inequalities of the deed of man, it forced him to come back to it, and to conform himself to its demands. Thus he learned criticism, thus he rose from naturalness into spirit. This progress is at the same time a progress from necessity to freedom, because criticism always gradually opens a way for man into insight, so that he finds the will of God to be the truth of his own self-determination. Because God is one and absolute, there arises the expectation that His Will will become the basis for the will of all nations and men. The criticism of the understanding must recognize a contradiction in the fact that the will of the true God is the law of only one nation; feared by other nations, moreover, by reason of their very worship of God as

a gloomy mystery, and detested as *odium generis humani*. And thus is developed the thought that the isolation of the believers will come to an end as soon as the other nations recognize their faith as the true one, and are received into it. Thus here, out of the deepest penetration of the soul into itself, as among the Romans out of the fusion of nations, we see appear the idea of the human race.

§ 233. (3) The progress from the past to the future unfolded the ideal servant of God who fulfils all the Law, and so blots out the empirical contradiction that the "Thou shalt" of the Law attains no adequate actuality. This Prince of Peace, who shall gather all nations under his banner, can therefore have no other thing predicated of him than Holiness. He is not beautiful as the Greeks represented their ideal, not brave and practical as was the venerated *Virtus* of the Romans; he does not place an infinite value on his individuality as the German does: but he is represented as insignificant in appearance, as patient, as humble, as he who, in order to reconcile the world, takes upon himself the infirmities and disgrace of all others. The ethnical nations have only a lost Paradise behind them; the Jews have one also before them. From this belief in the Messiah who is to come, from the certainty which they have of conquering with him, from the power of esteeming all things of small importance in view of such a future, springs the indestructible nature of the Jews. They ignore the fact that Christianity is the necessary result of their own history. As the nation that is to be (*des Setnsollens*), they are merely a historical nation, the nation among nations, whose education—whenever the Jew has not changed and corrupted its nature through modern culture—is still always patriarchal, hierarchal, and mnemonic.

THIRD DIVISION.

THE SYSTEM OF HUMANITARIAN EDUCATION.

§ 234. The systems of national and theocratic education came to the same result, though by different ways, and this result is the conception of a human race in the unity of which the distinctions of different nations find their Truth. But with them this result is only a conception, being a thing external to their actuality. They arrive at the painting of an

ideal of the way in which the Messiah shall come. But these ideals exist only in the mind, and the actual condition of the people sometimes does not correspond to them at all, and sometimes only very relatively. The idea of spirit had in these presuppositions the possibility of its concrete actualization; one individual man must become conscious of the universality and necessity of the will as being the very essence of his own freedom, so that all heteronomy should be cancelled in the autonomy of spirit. Natural individuality appearing as national determinateness was still acknowledged, but was deprived of its abstract isolation. The divine authority of the truth of the individual will is to be recognized, but at the same time freed from its estrangement towards itself. While Christ was a Jew and obedient to the divine Law, he knew himself as the universal man who determines himself to his own destiny; and while only distinguishing God, as subject, from himself, yet holds fast to the unity of man and God. The system of humanitarian education began to unfold from this principle, which no longer accords the highest place to the natural unity of national individuality, nor to the abstract obedience of the command of God, but to that freedom of the soul which knows itself to be absolute necessity. Christ is not a mere ideal of the thought, but is known as a living member of actual history, whose life, sufferings and death for freedom form the security as to its absolute justification and truth. The æsthetic, philosophical, and political ideal are all found in the universal nature of the Christian ideal, on which account no one of them appears one-sided in the life of Christ. The principle of Human Freedom excludes neither art, nor science, nor political feeling.

§ 235. In its conception of man the humanitarian education includes both the national divisions and the subjection of all men to the divine law, but it will no longer endure that one should grow into an isolating exclusiveness, and another into a despotism which includes in it somewhat of the accidental. But this principle of humanity and human nature took root so slowly that its presuppositions were repeated within itself and were really conquered in this reproduction. These stages of culture were the Greek, the Roman, and the

Protestant churches, and education was metamorphosed to suit the formation of each of these.

—For the sake of brevity we would wish to close with these general definitions; the unfolding of their details is intimately bound up with the history of politics and of civilization. We shall be contented if we give correctly the general whole.—

§ 236. Within education we can distinguish three epochs: the monkish, the chivalric, and that education which is to fit one for civil life. Each of these endeavored to express all that belonged to humanity as such; but it was only after the recognition of the moral nature of the Family, of Labor, of Culture, and of the conscious equal title of all men to their rights, that this became really possible.

I. The Epoch of Monkish Education.

§ 237. The Greek Church seized the Christian principle still abstractly as deliverance from the world, and therefore, in the education proceeding from it, it arrived only at the negative form, positing the universality of the individual man as the renunciation of self. In the dogmatism of its teaching, as well as in the ascetic severity of its practical conduct, it was a reproduction of the theocratic principle. But when this had assumed the form of national centralization, the Greek Church dispensed with this, and, as far as regards its form, it returned again to the quietism of the Orient.

§ 238. The monkish education is in general identical in all religions, in that, through the egotism of its way of living and the stoicism of its way of thinking, through the separation of its external existence and the mechanism of a thoughtless subjection to a general rule as well as to the special command of superiors, it fosters a spiritual and bodily dulness. The Christian monachism, therefore, as the fulfilment of monachism in general, is at the same time its absolute dissolution, because, in its merely abstracting itself from the world instead of affirmatively conquering it, it contradicts the very principle of Christianity.

§ 239. We must notice as the fundamental error of this whole system, that it does not in free individuality seek to produce the ideal of divine-humanity, but to copy in exter-

nal reproduction its historical manifestation. Each human being must individually offer up as sacrifice his own individuality. Each biography has its Bethlehem, its Tabor, and its Golgotha.

§ 240. Monachism looks upon freedom from one's self and from the world which Christianity demands only as an abstract renunciation of self, which it seeks to compass, like Buddhism, by the vow of poverty, chastity, and obedience, which must be taken by each individual for all time.

— This rejection of property, of marriage, and of self-will, is at the same time the negation of work, of the family, and of responsibility for one's actions. In order to avoid the danger of avarice and covetousness, of sensuality and of nepotism, of error and of guilt, monachism seizes the convenient way of abstract severance from all the objective world without being able fully to carry out this negation. Monkish Pedagogics must, in consequence, be very particular about an external separation of their disciples from the world, so as to make the work of abstraction from the world easier and more decided. It therefore builds cloisters in the solitude of deserts, in the depth of forests, on the summits of mountains, and surrounds them with high walls having no apertures; and then, so as to carry the isolation of the individual to its farthest possible extreme it constructs, within these cloisters, cells, in imitation of the ancient hermits—a seclusion the immediate consequence of which is the most limitless and most paltry curiosity.—

§ 241. Theoretically the monkish Pedagogics seeks, by means of the greatest possible silence, to place the soul in a state of spiritual immobility, which at last, through the want of all variety of thought, goes over into entire apathy, and antipathy towards all intellectual culture. The principal feature of the practical culture consists in the misapprehension that one should ignore Nature, instead of morally freeing himself from her control. As she again and again asserts herself, the monkish discipline proceeds to misuse her, and strives through fasting, through sleeplessness, through voluntary self-inflicted pain and martyrdom, not only to subdue the wantonness of the flesh, but to destroy the love of life till it shall become a positive loathing of existence. In and

for itself the object of the monkish vow—property, the family, and will—is not immoral. The vow is, on this account, very easy to violate. In order to prevent all temptation to this, monkish Pedagogics invents a system of supervision, partly open, partly secret, which deprives one of all freedom of action, all freshness of thinking and of willing, and all poetry of feeling, by means of the perpetual shadow of spies and informers. The monks are well-versed in all police-arts, and the regular succession of the hierarchy spurs them on always to distinguish themselves in them.

§ 242. The gloomy breath of this education penetrated all the relations of the Byzantine State. Even the education of the emperor was infected by it; and in the strife for freedom waged by the modern Greeks against the Turks, the *Igumeni* of the cloisters were the real leaders of the insurrection. The independence of individuality, as opposed to monkish abstraction, more or less degenerates into the crude form of soldier and pirate life. And thus it happened that this principle was not left to appear merely as an exception, but to be built up positively into humanity; and this the German world, under the guidance of the Roman Church, undertook to accomplish.

II. *The Epoch of Chivalric Education.*

§ 243. The Romish Church negated the abstract substantiality of the Greeks through the practical aim which she in her sanctity in works founded, and by means of which she raised up German individuality to the idealism of chivalry, i.e. a free military service in behalf of Christendom.

§ 244. It is evident that the system of monkish education was taken up into this epoch as one of its elements, being modified to conform to it: e.g. the Benedictines were accustomed to labor in agriculture and in the transcribing of books, and this contradicted the idea of monachism, since that in and for itself tends to an absolute forgetfulness of the world and a perfect absence of all activity in the individual. The begging orders were public preachers, and made popular the idea of love and unselfish devotion to others. They labored toward self-education, especially by means of the ideal of the life of Christ; e.g. in Tauler's classical book on

the Imitation of Jesus, and in the work of Thomas-à-Kempis which resembles it. Through a fixed contemplative communion with the conception of the Christ who suffered and died for Love, they sought to find content in divine rest and self-abandonment.

§ 245. German chivalry sprang from Feudalism. The education of those pledged to military duty had become confined to practice in the use of arms. The education of the chivalric vassals pursued the same course, refining it gradually through the influence of court society and through poetry, which devoted itself either to the relating of graceful tales which were really works of art, or to the glorification of woman. Girls were brought up without especial care. The boy until he was seven years old remained in the hands of women; then he became a lad (a young gentleman), and learned the manner of offensive and defensive warfare, on foot and on horseback; between his sixteenth and eighteenth year, through a formal ceremony (the laying on of the sword), he was duly authorized to bear arms. But whatever besides this he might wish to learn was left to his own caprice.

§ 246. In contradistinction to the monkish education, Chivalry placed an infinite value on individuality, and this it expressed in its extreme sensibility to the feeling of honor. Education, on this account, endeavored to foster this reflection of the self upon itself by means of the social isolation in which it placed knighthood. The knight did not delight himself with common possessions, but he sought for him who had been wronged, since with him he could find enjoyment as a conqueror. He did not live in simple marriage, but strove for the piquant pleasure of making the wife of another the lady of his heart, and this often led to moral and physical infidelity. And, finally, the knight did not obey alone the general laws of knightly honor, but he strove, besides, to discover for himself strange things, which he should undertake with his sword, in defiance of all criticism, simply because it pleased his caprice so to do. He *sought adventures*.

§ 247. The reaction against the innumerable number of fantastic extravagancies arising from chivalry was the idea of the spiritual chivalry which was to unite the cloister and

the town, abstract self-denial and military life, separation from the world and the sovereignty of the world—an undeniable advance, but an untenable synthesis which could not prevent the dissolution of chivalry—this chivalry, which, as the rule of the stronger, induced for a long time the destruction of all regular culture founded on principles, and brought a period of absence of all education. In this perversion of chivalry to a grand vagabondism, and even to robbery, noble souls often rushed into ridiculous excesses. This decline of chivalry found its truth in Citizenship, whose education, however, did not, like the *πόλις* and the *civitas* of the ancients, limit itself to itself, but, through the presence of the principle of Christianity, accepted the whole circle of humanity as the aim of its culture.

III. *The Epoch of Education fitting one for Civil Life.*

-§ 248. The idea of the State had gradually worked itself up to a higher plane with trade and industry, and found in Protestantism its spiritual confirmation. Protestantism, as the self-assurance of the individual that he was directly related to God without any dependence on the mediation of any man, rose to the truth in the autonomy of the soul, and began out of the abstract phantasmagoria of monachism and chivalry to develop Christianity, as the principle of humanitarian education, into concrete actuality. The cities were not merely, in comparison with the clergy and the nobility, the "third estate"; but the citizen who himself managed his commonwealth, and defended its interests with arms, developed into the citizen of a state which absorbed the clergy and nobility, and the state-citizen found his ultimate ideal in pure Humanity as cognized through reason.

§ 249. The phases of this development are (1) Civil education as such, in which we find chivalric education metamorphosed into the so-called noble, both however being controlled as to education, within Catholicism by Jesuitism, within Protestantism by Pietism. (2) Against this tendency to the church, we find reacting on the one hand the devotion to a study of antiquity, and on the other the friendly alliance to immediate actuality, i.e. with Nature. We can name these periods of Pedagogics those of its ideals of

culture. (3) But the truth of all culture must forever remain moral freedom. After Education had arrived at a knowledge of the meaning of Idealism and Realism, it must seize as its absolute aim the moral emancipation of man into Humanity; and it must conform its culture by this aim, since technical dexterity, friendly adroitness, proficiency in the arts, and scientific insight, can attain to their proper rank only through moral purity.

1. Civil Education as such.

§ 250. The one-sidedness of monkish and chivalric education was cancelled by civil education inasmuch as it destroyed the celibacy of the monk and the estrangement of the knight from his family, doing this by means of the inner life of the family; for it substituted, in the place of the negative emptiness of the duty of holiness of the celibate, the positive morality of marriage and the family; while, instead of the abstract poverty and the idleness of the monkish piety and of knighthood, it asserted that property was the object of labor, i.e. it asserted the self-governed morality of civil society and of commerce; and, finally, instead of the servitude of the conscience in unquestioning obedience to the command of others, and instead of the freakish self-sufficiency of the caprice of the knights, it demanded obedience to the laws of the commonwealth as representing his own self-conscious, actualized, practical Reason, in which laws the individual can recognize and acknowledge himself.

—As this civil education left free the sensuous enjoyment, freedom in this was without bounds for a time, until, after men became accustomed to labor and to their freedom of action, the possibility of enjoyment created from within outward a moderation which sumptuary laws and prohibitions of gluttony, drunkenness, &c., could never create from the external side. What the monk inconsistently enjoyed with a bad conscience, the citizen and the clergyman could take possession of as a gift of God. After the first millennium of Christianity, when the earth had not, according to the current prophecies, been destroyed, and after the great plague in the fourteenth century, there was felt an immense pleasure in living, which manifested itself externally

in the fifteenth century in delicate wines, dainty food, great eating of meat, drinking of beer, and, in the domain of dress, in peaked shoes, plumes, golden chains, bells, &c. There was much venison, but, as yet, no potatoes, tea and coffee, &c. The feeling of men was quarrelsome. For a more exact painting of the Education of this time, very valuable authors are Sebastian Brant, Th. Murner, Ulrich von Hutten, Fischart, and Hans Sachs. Gervinus is almost the only one who has understood how to make this material useful in its relation to spirit.—

§ 251. In contrast with the heaven-seeking of the monks and the sentimental love-making of the knight, civil education established, as its principle, Usefulness, which traced out in things their conformity to a proposed end in order to gain as great a mastery over them as possible. The understanding was trained with all exactness that it might clearly seize all the circumstances. But since family-life did not allow the egotism of the individual ever to become as great as was the case with the monk and the knight, and since the cheer of a sensuous enjoyment in cellar and kitchen, in clothing and furniture, in common games and in picturesque parades, penetrated the whole being with soft pleasure, there was developed with all propriety and sobriety a house-morality, and, with all the prose of labor, a warm and kindly disposition, which left room for innocent merriment and roguery, and found, in conformity to religious services, its serious transfiguration. Beautiful burgher-state, thou wast weakened by the thirty years' war, and hast been only accidentally preserved sporadically in Old England and in some places in Germany, only to be at last swept away by the flood of modern world-pain, political sophistry, and anxiety for the future!

§ 252. The citizen paid special attention to public education, heretofore wholly dependent upon the church and the cloister; he organized city schools, whose teachers, it is true, for a long time compassed only accidental culture, and were often employed only for tumultuous and short terms. The society of the brotherhood of the Hieronymites introduced a better system of instruction before the close of the fourteenth century, but education had often to be obtained from the so-

called travelling scholars (*vagantes, bacchantes, scholastici, goliardi*). The teachers of the so-called *scholæ exteriores*, in distinction from the schools of the cathedral and cloister, were called now *locati*, then *stampuales*—in German, *Kinder-Meister*. The institution of German schools soon followed the Latin city schools. In order to remove the anarchy in school matters, the citizens aided the rise of universities by donations and well-invested funds, and sustained the street-singing of the city scholars (*currende*), an institution which was well-meant, but which often failed of its end because on the one hand it was often misused as a mere means of subsistence, and on the other hand the sense of honor of those to whom it was devoted not unfrequently became, through their manner of living, lowered to humiliation. The defect of the monkish method of instruction became ever more apparent, e.g. the silly tricks of their mnemotechnique, the utter lack of anything which deserved the name of any practical knowledge, &c. The necessity of instruction in the use of arms led to democratic forms. Printing favored the same. Men began to concern themselves about good text-books. Melanchthon was the hero of the Protestant world, and as a pattern was beyond his time. His *Dialectics*, *Rhetoric*, *Physics*, and *Ethics*, were reprinted innumerable times, commented upon, and imitated. After him Amos Comenius, in the seventeenth century, had the greatest influence through his *Didactica Magna* and his *Janua Reserta*. In a narrower sphere, treating of the foundation of Gymnasial Philology, the most noticeable is Sturm of Strasburg. The universities in Catholic countries limited themselves to the Scholastic Philosophy and Theology, together with which we find slowly struggling up the Roman Law and the system of Medicine from Bologna and Salerno. But Protestantism first raised the university to any real universality. Tübingen, Königsberg, Wittenberg, Jena, Leipzig, Halle, Göttingen, &c., were the first schools for the study of all sciences, and for their free and productive pursuit.

§ 253. The Commons, which at first appeared with the clergy and the nobility as the Third Estate, formed an alliance with monarchy, and both together produced a transformation of the chivalric education. Absolutism reduced the knights to

mere nobles, to whom it truly conceded the prerogative of appointment as spiritual prelates as well as officers and counsellors of state, but only on the condition of the most complete submission; and then, to satisfy them, it invented the artificial drinking festivals, of a splendid life at court, and a temptingly-impressive sovereignty of beauty. In this condition, the education of the nobles was essentially changed in so far as to cease to be alone military. To the art of war, which moreover was made so very much milder by the invention of fire-arms, must be now added an activity of the mind which could no longer dispense with some knowledge of History, Heraldry, Genealogy, Literature, and Mythology. Since the French nation soon enough gave tone to the style of conversation, and after the time of Louis XIV. controlled the politics of the continent, the French language, as conventional and diplomatic, became a constant element in the education of the nobility in all the other countries of Europe.

—Practically the education of the noble endeavored to make the individual quite independent, so that he should, by means of the important quality of an advantageous personal appearance and the prudence of his agreeable behavior, make himself into a ruler of all other men, capable of enjoying his own position, i.e. he should copy in miniature the manners of an absolute sovereign. To this was added an empirical knowledge of men by means of ethical maxims, so that they might discover the weak side of every man, and so be able to outwit him. *Mundus vult decipi, ergo decipitur*. According to this, every man had his price. They did not believe in the Nemesis of a divine destiny; on the contrary, disbelief in the higher justice was taught. One must be so elastic as to suit himself to all situations, and, as a caricature of the ancient ataraxy, he must acquire as a second nature a manner perfectly indifferent to all changes, the impassibility of an aristocratic repose, the amphibious *sang-froid* of the "gentleman." The man in the world as the man of the world sought his ideal in endless dissimulation, and in this, as the flowering of his culture, he took the highest interest. Intrigue, in love as well as in politics, was the soul of the nobleman's existence.

—They endeavored to complete the refinement of manners

by sending the young man away with a travelling tutor. This was very good, but degenerated at last into the mechanism of the foolish travelling of the tourist. The noble was made a foreigner, a stranger to his own country, by means of his abode at Paris or Venice, while the citizen gradually outstripped him in genuine culture.

§ 254. The education of the citizen as well as that of the noble was taken possession of, in Catholic countries by the Jesuits, in Protestant countries by the Pietists: by the first, with a military strictness; by the second, in a social and effeminate form. Both, however, agreed in destroying individuality, inasmuch as the one degraded man into a will-less machine for executing the commands of others, and the other deadened him in cultivating the feeling of his sinful worthlessness.

(a) *Jesuitic Education.*

§ 255. Jesuitism combined the maximum of worldly freedom with an appearance of the greatest piety. Proceeding from this stand-point, it devoted itself in education to elegance and showy knowledge, to diplomacy and what was suitable and convenient in morals. To bring the future more into its power, it adapted itself not only to youth in general, but especially to the youth of the nobler classes. To please these, the Jesuits laid great stress upon a fine deportment. In their colleges dancing and fencing were well-taught. They knew how well they should by this course content the noble, who had by preference usurped the name of Education for this technical way of giving formal expression to personality.

—In instruction they developed so exact a mechanism that they gained the reputation of having model school regulations, and even Protestants sent their children to them. From the close of the sixteenth century to the present time they have based their teaching upon the *ratio et institutio Studiorum Societatis Jesu* of Claudius Aquaviva, and, following that, they distinguish two courses of teaching, a higher and a lower. The lower included nothing but an external knowledge of the Latin language, and some fortuitous knowledge of History, of Antiquities, and of Mythology. The memory was cultivated as a means of keeping down free activity of thought and clearness of judgment. The higher course com-

prehended Dialectics, Rhetoric, Physics, and Morals. Dialectics appeared in the form of Sophistry. In Rhetoric, they favored the polemical-emphatic style of the African fathers of the Church and their pompous phraseology; in Physics, they stopped with Aristotle, and especially advised the reading of the books *De Generatione et Corruptione*, and *De Cælo*, on which they commented after their fashion; finally, in Morals casuistic skepticism was their central point. They made much of Rhetoric on account of their sermons, giving to it much attention, and introduced especially Declamation. Contriving showy public examinations under the guise of Latin School Comedies, they thus amused the public, disposed them to approval, and at the same time quite innocently practised the pupil in dissimulation.

—Diplomacy in behavior was made necessary to the Jesuits as well by their strict military discipline as by their system of reciprocal mistrust, espionage, and informing. Abstract obedience was a reason for any act of the pupils, and they were freed from all responsibility as to its moral justification. This empirical exact following out of all commands, and refraining from any criticism as to principles, created a moral indifference, and, from the necessity of having consideration for the peculiarities and caprices of the superior on whom all others were dependent, arose eye-service, and the coldness of isolation sprang from the necessity which each felt of being on his guard against every other as against a tale-bearer. The most deliberate hypocrisy and pleasure in intrigue merely for the sake of intrigue—this most refined poison of moral corruption—were the result. Jesuitism had not only an interest in the material profit, which, when it had corrupted souls, fell to its share, but it also had an interest in the process of corruption. With absolute indifference as to the idea of morality, and absolute indifference as to the moral quality of the means used to attain its end, it rejoiced in the superiority of secrecy, of the accomplished and calculating understanding, and in deceiving the credulous by means of its graceful, seemingly-perfect, moral language.

—It is not necessary to speak here of the morality of the Order. It is sufficiently recognized as the contradiction, that the idea of morality insists upon the eternal necessity of

every deed, but that in the realizing of the action all determinations should be made relative and should vary with the circumstances. As to discipline, they were always guided by their fundamental principle, that body and soul, as in and for themselves one, could vicariously suffer for each other. Thus penitence and contrition were transformed into a perfect materialism of outward actions, and hence arose the punishments of the Order, in which fasting, scourging, imprisonment, mortification, and death, were formed into a mechanical artificial system.

(b) *Pietistic Education.*

§ 256. Jesuitism would make machines of man, Pietism would dissolve him in the feeling of his sinfulness: either would destroy his individuality. Pietism proceeded from the principle of Protestantism, as, in the place of the Catholic Pelagianism with its sanctification by works, it offered justification by faith alone. In its tendency to internality was its just claim: It would have even the letters of the Bible translated into the vivacity of sentiment. But in its execution it fell into the error of one-sidedness in that it placed, instead of the actuality of the spirit and its freedom, the confusion of a limited personality, placing in its stead the personality of Christ in an external manner, and thus brought back into the very midst of Protestantism the principle of monachism—an abstract renunciation of the world. Since Protestantism has destroyed the idea of the cloister, it could produce estrangement from the world only by exciting public opinion against such elements of society and culture which it stigmatized as *worldly* for its members, e.g. card-playing, dancing, the theatre, &c. Thus it became negatively dependent upon works; for since its followers remained in reciprocal action with the world, so that the temptation to backsliding was a permanent one, it must watch over them, exercise an indispensable moral-police control over them, and thus, by the suspicion of each other which was involved, take up into itself the Jesuitical practice, although in a very mild and affectionate way. Instead of the forbidden secrecy of the cloister, it organized a separate company, which we, in its regularly constituted assembly, call a conventicle. Instead of the cowl, it put on

its youth a dress like that of the world, but scant and ashen-colored; it substituted for the tonsure closely-cut hair and shaven beard, and it often went beyond the obedience of the monks in its expression of pining humility and prudish composure. Education within such a circle could not well recognize nature and history as manifestations of God, but it must consider them to be limitations to their union with God, from which death can first then completely release them. The soul which knew that its home could be found only in the future world, must feel itself to be a stranger upon the earth, and from such an opinion there must arise an indifference and even a contempt for science and art, as well as an aversion for a life of active labor, though an unwilling and forced tribute might be paid to it. Philosophy especially was to be shunned as dangerous. Bible lectures, the catechism and the hymn-book, were the one thing needful to the "poor in spirit." Religious poetry and music were, of all the arts, the only ones deserving of any cultivation. The education of Pietism endeavored, by means of a carefully arranged series of representations, to create in its disciples the feeling of their absolute nothingness, vileness, godlessness, and abandonment by God, in order to displace the torment of despair as to themselves and the world by a warm, dramatic, and living relation to Christ—a relation in which all the Eroticism of the mystical passion of the begging-friars was renewed in a somewhat milder form and with a strong tendency to a sentimental sweetishness.

2. The Ideal of Culture.

§ 257. Civil Education arose from the recognition of marriage and the family, of labor and enjoyment, of the equality of all before the Law, and of the duty of self-determination. Jesuitism in the Catholic world and Pietism in the Protestant were the reaction against this recognition—a return into the abstract asceticism of the middle ages, not however in its purity, but mixed with some regard for worldly possessions. In opposition to this reaction the commonwealth produced another, in which it undertook to deliver individuality by means of a reversed alienation. On the one hand, it absorbed itself in the conception of the Greek-Roman world. In the

practical interests of the present, it externalized man in a past which held to the present no immediate relation, or it externalized him in the affairs which were to serve him as means of his comfort and enjoyment; it created an abstract idealism—a reproduction of the old view of the world—or an abstract Realism in a high appreciation of things which should be considered of value only as a means. In one direction, Individuality proceeded towards a dead nationality; in the other, towards an unlimited world-commonwealth. In one case, the ideal was the æsthetic republicanism of the Greeks; in the other, the utilitarian cosmopolitanism of the Romans. But, in considering the given circumstances, both united in the feeling of humanity, with its reconciliatory and pitying gentleness toward the beggar or the criminal.

(a) *The Humanitarian Ideal.*

§ 258. The Oriental-theocratic education is immanent in Christian education through the Bible. Through the mediation of the Greek and Roman churches the views of the ancient world were subsumed but not entirely subdued. To accomplish this was the problem of humanitarian education. It aimed to teach the Latin and Greek languages, expecting thus to secure the action of a purely humane disposition. The Greeks and Romans being sharply marked nationalities, how could one cherish such expectations? It was possible only relatively in contradiction, partly to a provincial population from whom all genuine political sense had departed, partly to a church limited by a confessional, to which the idea of humanity as such had become almost lost in dogmatic fault-findings. The spirit was refreshed in the first by the contemplation of the pure patriotism of the ancients, and in the second by the discovery of Reason among the heathen. In contrast to formlessness distracted by the want of all ideal of culture of provincialism and dogmatic confusions, we find the power of representation of ancient art. The so-called uselessness of learning dead languages imparted to the mind, it knew not how, an ideal drift. The very fact that it could not find immediate profit in its knowledge gave it the consciousness of a higher value than material profit. The ideal of the Humanities was the truth to

Nature which was found in the thought-painters of the ancient world. The study of language merely with regard to its form, must lead one involuntarily to the actual seizing of its content. The Latin schools were fashioned into *Gymnasia*, and the universities contained not merely professors of Eloquence, but also teachers of Philology.

(b) *The Philanthropic Ideal.*

§ 259. The humanitarian tendency reached its extreme in the abstract forgetting of the present, and the omitting to notice its just claim. Man discovered at last that he was not at home with himself in Rome and Athens. He spoke and wrote Latin, if not like Cicero, at least like Muretus, but he often found himself awkward in expressing his meaning in his mother-tongue. He was often very learned, but he lacked judgment. He was filled with enthusiasm for the republicanism of Greece and Rome, and yet at the same time was himself exceedingly servile to his excellent and august lords. Against this gradual deadening of active individuality, the result of a perverted study of the classics, we find now reacting the education of enlightenment, which we generally call the philanthropic. It sought to make men friendly to the immediate course of the world. It placed over against the learning of the ancient languages for their own sake, the acquisition of the more needful branches of Mathematics, Physics, Geography, History, and the modern languages, calling these the real studies. Nevertheless it often retained the instruction in the Latin language because the Romance languages have sprung from it, and because, through its long domination, the universal terminology of Science, Art, and Law, is rooted in it. Philanthropy desired to develop the social side of its disciple through an abstract of practical knowledge and personal accomplishments, and to lead him again, in opposition to the hermit-like sedentary life of the book-pedant, out into the fields and the woods. It desired to imitate life even in its method, and to instruct pleasantly in the way of play or by dialogue. It would add to the simple letters and names the contemplation of the object itself, or at least of its representation by pictures; and in this direction, in the conversation-literature which it prepared for

children, it sometimes fell into childishness. It performed a great service when it gave to the body its due, and introduced simple, natural dress, bathing, gymnastics, pedestrian excursions, and a hardening against the influences of wind and weather. As this Pedagogics, so friendly to children, deemed that it could not soon enough begin to honor them as citizens of the world, it was guilty in general of the error of presupposing as already finished in its children much that it itself should have gradually developed; and as it wished to educate the European as such, or rather man as such, it came into an indifference concerning the concrete distinctions of nationality and religion. It coincided with the philologists in placing, in a concealed way, Socrates above Christ, because he had worked no miracles, and taught only morality. In such a dead cosmopolitanism, individuality disappeared in the indeterminateness of a general humanity, and saw itself forced to agree with the humanistic education in proclaiming the truth of Nature as the pedagogical ideal, with the distinction, that while Humanism believed this ideal realized in the Greeks and Romans, Philanthropism found itself compelled to presuppose an abstract notion, and often manifested a not unjustifiable pleasure in recognizing in the Indians of North America, or of Otaheite, the genuine man of nature. Philosophy first raised these conceptions to the idea of the State, which fashioned the cognition of Reason and of the reform which follows from its idea, into an organic element in itself.

—The course which the developing of the philanthropic ideal has taken is as follows: (1) Rousseau in his writings, *Emile* and the *Nouvelle Heloise*, first preached the evangel of Natural Education, the abstraction from History, the negation of existing culture, and the return to the simplicity and innocence of nature. Although he often himself testified in his experience his own proneness to evil in a very discouraging way, he fixed as an almost unlimited axiom in French and German Pedagogics his principal maxim, that man is by nature good. (2) The reformatory ideas of Rousseau met with only a very infrequent and sporadic introduction among the Romanic nations, because among them education was too dependent on the church, and retained its cloister-like

seclusion in seminaries, colleges, &c. In Germany, on the contrary, it was actualized, and the *Philanthropia*, established by Basedow in Dessau, Brunswick, and Schnepfenthal, made experiments, which nevertheless very soon departed somewhat from the ultraism of Basedow and had very excellent results. (3) Humanity existed *in concreto* only in the form of nations. The French nation, in their revolution, tried the experiment of abstracting from their history, of levelling all distinctions of culture, of enthroning a despotism of Reason, and of organizing itself as humanity, pure and simple. The event showed the impossibility of such a beginning. The national energy, the historical impulse, the love of art and science, came forth from the midst of the revolutionary abstraction, which was opposed to them, only the more vigorously. The *grande nation*, their *grande armée*, and *gloire*—that is to say, for France—absorbed all the humanitarian phases. In Germany the philanthropic circle of education was limited to the higher ranks. There was no exclusiveness in the *Philanthropia*, for there nobles and citizens, Catholics and Protestants, Russians and Swiss, were mingled; but these were always the children of wealthy families, and to these the plan of education was adapted. Then appeared Pestalozzi and directed education also to the lower classes of society—those which are called, not without something approaching to a derogatory meaning, *the people*. From this time dates popular education, the effort for the intellectual and moral elevation of the hitherto neglected atomistic human being of the non-property-holding multitude. There shall in future be no dirty, hungry, ignorant, awkward, thankless, and will-less mass, devoted alone to an animal existence. We can never rid ourselves of the lower classes by having the wealthy give something, or even their all, to the poor, so as to have no property themselves; but we can rid ourselves of it in the sense that the possibility of culture and independent self-support shall be open to every one, because he is a human being and a citizen of the commonwealth. Ignorance and rudeness and the vice which springs from them, and the malevolent frame of mind against the human race, which are bound up with crime—these shall disappear. Education shall train man to self-conscious obe-

dience to law, as well as to kindly feeling towards the erring, and to an effort not merely for their removal but for their improvement. But the more Pestalozzi endeavored to realize his ideal of human dignity, the more he comprehended that the isolated power of a private man could not attain it, but that the nation itself must make their own education their first business. Fichte by his lectures first made the German nation fully accept these thoughts, and Prussia was the first state which, by her public schools and her conscious preparation for defence, broke the path for National Education; while among the Romanic nations, in spite of their more elaborate political formalism, it still depends partly upon the church and partly upon the accident of private enterprise. Pestalozzi also laid a foundation for a national pedagogical literature by his story of *Leonard and Gertrude*. This book appeared at first in 1784, i.e. in the same year in which Schiller's *Robbers* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* announced a new phase in the Drama and in Philosophy.

—The incarnation of God, which was, up to the time of the Reformation, an esoteric mystery of the Church, has since then become continually more and more an exoteric problem of the State.—

3. Free Education.

§ 260. The ideal of culture of the humanitarian and the philanthropic education was taken up into the conception of an education which recognizes the Family, social caste, the Nation, and Religion, as positive elements of the practical spirit, but which will know each of these as determined from within through the idea of humanity, and laid open for reciprocal dialectic with the rest. Physical development shall become the subject of a national system of gymnastics fashioned for use, and including in itself the knowledge of the use of arms. Instruction shall, in respect to the general encyclopædic culture, be the same for all, and parallel to this shall run a system of special schools to prepare for the special avocations of life. The method of instruction shall be the simple representation of the special idea of the subject, and no longer the formal breadth of an acquaintance with many subjects which may find outside the school its opportunity, but within it has no meaning except as the history of a sci-

ence or an art. Moral culture must be combined with family affection and the knowledge of the laws of the commonwealth, so that the dissension between individual morality and objective legality may ever more and more disappear. Education shall, without estranging the individual from the internality of the family, accustom him more and more to public life, because criticism of this is the only thing which can prevent the cynicism of private life, the half-ness of knowledge and will, and the spirit of caste, which has so extensively prevailed. The individual shall be educated into a self-consciousness of the essential equality and freedom of all men, so that he shall recognize and acknowledge himself in each one and in all. But this essential and solid unity of all men shall not evaporate into the insipidity of a humanity without distinctions, but instead it shall realize the form of a determinate individuality and nationality, and shall enlighten the idiosyncrasy of its nation into a broad humanity. The unrestricted striving after Beauty, Truth, and Freedom, actually through its own strength and immediately, not merely mediately through ecclesiastical consecration, will become Religion.

The Education of the State must rise to a preparation for the unfettered activity of self-conscious Humanity.

THE GRAND MAN.

By THERON GRAY.

The phrase that leads our thought in this discussion of some of the affairs of experience is becoming somewhat frequent in use, and, as it is questionable whether there is a due appreciation of the real purport thereof, and of the practical bearing or sway thence derived in all human conduct, it may be well to give it a moment's consideration. Man is somewhat known, we may suppose, but mostly known, doubtless, in his limited, private, individual form; in that which isolates or separates him from the race, rather than that which unites him with it. He is mostly known in extreme contrast—by marked distinction from his kind, instead of integral alliance that consolidates in firm solidity and

strength. Hence we are apt to use our best endeavors to prompt *vir-tuous* action, thus practically ignoring and nullifying the thought of a *homo-geneous* manhood, which alone can glorify virtue in a common sunshine of life—a kindred human fervor that shall glow and melt and mingle, and never languish nor fade away for want of base foil in human distress.

Surely man *is* individual, private, or personal, as also common, public, or social, in nature, spirit, and power. Otherwise there were only a blank chaos for him that must swamp him forever in the gloomy depths of mere brute nature.

In order to be sure of our reckoning, and to exhibit to the understanding just what we understand the Grand Man to comprehend, let us try to properly define.

We hold the term to mean the aggregate humanity; mankind as a unit, in nature, power, and destiny. The first seal to such a unit is a common origin—natural consanguinity—one-ness of blood. The second seal is a one-ness of spiritual energy, that prompts every individual of the race to press onward in the endeavor for fuller personal realizations in life. The third seal is a unity of destiny, that assures true social alliance, fullest opportunity and clear competence for all. The first is like a motionless sea, sure to become putrid if left thus to stagnate. The second makes a common motor or stimulus of action, which, although engendering painful turbulence of particles and seeming destruction, tends to work the whole body pure and good in constant use. The third is the inexhaustible fount or ocean, competent to satisfy all thirst, allay all the fevers of life, and amply to refresh forevermore.

In plain terms, the first estate of mankind, as a whole, is one of common inheritance in native equality, practically void of the differential human spirit requisite to develop personal force, or individual character, while yet *involving* that spirit in latent form. The second is one of universal strife and toil under the active promptings of this involved spirit, and fosters continual connection and discord as means to a worthy end—full accordance. The third is one of rest and peace through perfect adjustment, by competent institutions, of “each with all and all with each”; making every indivi-

dual factor a firm integer to an integral public body. They all stand by together as successive forms of one structure; a one comprising an involved primary as a ground of action, an evolutionary course as a process of action, and an evolved result as the object of such action. These are held to comprise the *thetic*, the *antithetic*, and the *synthetic*, aspects of the *one*. Like the order of the solar system, the first term, under the diction of centripetal law, tends to obliterate the human in the Divine; the second term, as centrifugal, tends to destruction through extreme, or unqualified, self-projection; the third tends to a reconciliation and balance of these extremes in an orbital poise that carries the perfected form on its own axis, in perpetual play around its Supreme Centre, whence alone it can derive light, heat, and requisite vital energy.

The elementary principles of this formula may be found in—first, *simple unity*, which buries personality in universality; second, in *duality*, which separates, self-asserts, or immediately antagonizes universality; third, in *trinity*, or compound unity, which unites, or reconciles, the prior contrarities in a new power of matchless worth—a power that orders and keeps all of the intrinsic glories of diversity in the supreme glory of eternal unity.

It is clear, accordingly, that the Grand Man can only become duly conscious of himself, in external realms, through an experience of the third condition indicated in our formula. In other words, the actual, complete organization and experience of full integral order in human affairs—of perfect society and fraternal alliance in all things—must be clearly effected before there can be due public consciousness of universal unity—divine social order with its boundless delights—as the sure vital constituent of human earthly destiny. As in the individual one identical life rules different eventful periods, and only comes to manly consciousness in the experience of manhood itself, so the race—humanity—slumbers long in prehistoric foetal environment, then emerges in a comparatively helpless and innocent state of childhood, then passes on to the boisterous turbulence of “the coming man” in the spirit of the youth, and only comes to know its true objective personality in the deliverance of a complete manhood

achieved. Extreme earthiness must be the generative initial of the Grand Man ; thence, for a time, comes a cradling amid the flowers of springtime, and bathings in the dewy breath of morning. Then come struggles with the sterner and more painful realities that beset his way and pierce and tear him, from which he finally emerges into an open experience of the sublime destination that ruled from the first, even while he was all unconscious of his essential Life.

In the great march of Humanity—the Grand Man in process of development—Christianity answers to this third estate, and applies itself to fulfil accordingly. Yet serious doubts ensue and questions spring up to chafe and plague the sturdiest intellects till there arises a clear understanding of the whole ground. Unless we sharply distinguish the real difference between the developing process of Christianity and the fruitional condition wherein that development is consummated, we shall be found reeling somewhat beneath the sturdy blows of skepticism ; at least we shall, otherwise, be unable to justify the Christian claims on rational grounds. We must know that in the race-career each distinctive form of human character exacts an era of growth wherein it is not distinctly visible in its essential character ; like the corn that germinates unseen in the earth, then, in higher form, is also covered by a course of stock-growth ; and again is hidden, in process of ear-growth, beneath its enveloping husk. The era of Christian development stands as this maturing process in the career of the Grand Man, while the era of accomplished ripeness throws down the perishable husk and exhibits the imperishable “corn fully ripe in the ear.” Seeing this, and knowing that the kingdom that “shall break in pieces and consume all other kingdoms” hath its foundations already firmly fixed, only needing some proper divesting of outward scaffolding and rubbish, we should find ourselves duly prepared to explicate the stirring events of seeming adversity that transpire during the developing throes of Christian civilization, and to point the clear way to the coming Day, even though immediately jolted and bruised amid present tumult. We should stand firmly to our task and labor as the husbandman, having first partaken of the fruit. We should see and know the risen Christ, with his great involution of “good-will

towards men, and on earth peace," to be made real through the supreme sway of his vital presence and power. Jesus, as the Christ, brought to light—personally revealed—the great realities that come to general consciousness in the actual experience of established harmony and order in human affairs; but those realities surely exacted the adverse and painful experience, in the career of the Grand Man, known and felt as the commotions of Christian development. And when such experience becomes a stumbling-block to the human intellect, and prompts it to question and deny the Christian verity itself, the need of a comprehensive intellectual poise becomes at once evident. The great law that, in all cases, makes the multiplication of a good in natural realms to depend upon a previous planting of that good there, and then upon a tedious experience in developing culture and structural effort in its behalf, before a worthy fruition can be had, must become apparent. Then, not only the shocking throes of Christian development will be found consistent, but its blessed promise of divine harmony and order in all earthly affairs will be not only anchored in the affections but also held in the intellect, as the adequate lumen on all occasions.

Accordingly, let our vision revert briefly to the status of the Grand Man to-day. Let us face some of the sterner realities of experience that confront us and challenge our faith in both God and man, threatening social dissolution and decay.

The pompous splendor of outward possession, of personal aggrandizement and display, so influences and commands in certain directions, that there is coming to be felt a fearful greed and an equally fearful disregard of neighborly interests under its promptings. Ambition to outweigh and outshine, in such comparatively unworthy ways, works constant mischief, making men unscrupulous and inhuman, even to the extent of the most hideous criminality in many instances. Then, in other quarters, comes into play all the forces of human nature with starved appetite, claiming satisfaction of its wants in all its broad range; while, amid prevailing antagonism of interest, competition, and especial self-assertion, hordes of such as are variously weak and less competent to crowd, strive, and supply wants, are prompted to seize

upon any means that seem to be available to serve, even though penal barriers pend at every point. Threats of disaster and death are weak where unregulated human passion and unrelieved natural want are in the ascendant. There is no ferocity more keen and relentless than that which is born of unrelieved human want—unregulated human nature. It will rage, storm, and destroy, in the endeavor to appease its promptings, whatever the obstacles erected or the inflictions threatened. It is not less determined to its native level than the waters in our streams; hence, if found malarious or destructive in its course, no obstructive device can long avail to check the flux. Only new channels—new means of expression—will remedy the evil and secure public welfare. In plain words, human nature is an irrepressible force, and, if found expressing itself violently and harmfully when operated by present methods, new ways should be devised and instituted to give more consistent expression; thus not only keeping the full power as a public treasure, but securing the freedom and dignity of the subject. Repression by force may for a time measurably check, but only perfectly ordered freedom will effectually cure, and thus serve both the individual and the public.

The problem doubtless requires new studies and more humane endeavors, but its solution is demanded as our only hope of peace and social order. Murders and every kind of violence are coming to be shockingly frequent. Men stand aghast before the floods of crime that surge upon us. Whenever life seems to menace passion, obstruct want, or in any way to thwart cherished designs, it is held to be awfully cheap, and is swept aside with horrid levity. Moved by all this, earnest, considerate minds are at least becoming duly inquisitive; and not a few are at loss which most to deplore, the low-bred rapacity that prowls and stabs in dark alleys and hidden retreats, in behalf of some personal end, or the inhuman anger and hate poured forth on every hand, towards these base offenders, in supposed behalf of public interests. The flippancy with which hate and vengeance leap forth to berate the wretches betokens murderous conditions on a large scale, more demoralizing and deplorable, if possible, than those private bloody horrors that are mostly born of

degradation and prostitution of one kind or another. One is Murder, well-dressed, challenging public recognition and approval—at least boldly presuming upon them; the other is Murder in rags, and filth, and debauchery—self-condemned, and solely intent upon dodging the policeman and hangman.

If the force thus spent in vindictive malediction were directed, instead, to a careful consideration of the motive powers of society, with its numerous covert traps and seductive springs which allure and destroy human worth—Manhood—when it should be stimulated and supported constantly and on every hand, we should at once begin to breathe a new and reviving social atmosphere, and feel new sensations of precious health and spirits never before imagined. Shall we thus begin to amend? or, shall we go on in the vain endeavor to give the Grand Man the coveted rest and integrity by petty amputations and lacerating thrusts? Let our answer to these questions take a wholesome practical turn, and all will yet be well. We must commence to build with strict reference to the End. We must shape all preliminaries by its clear light. Especially as a Nation planted distinctly in the principle of this intrinsic unity of private and public, special and general, personal and combined interests in a universal fraternization, we must proceed to form and conduct all of our civil affairs in actual consistency therewith. In this way, and in this way alone, may we hope to live and prosper and become the great nation that we must, to verify our national principle of “each in all and all in each.”

The initial conception of our nationality, distinctly involving the principle of full composite order—the unity of all, in interest, power, and social worth—was clearly announced, and partially formulated in institutions, at the first; but it was utterly impossible that fruition should come at the time of planting. A long course of faithful toil was requisite—labor that should truly comprehend the nature of the seed and the promise of the harvest, and thus insure issues in all respects complete. During immaturity we doubtless needed penal institutions and all the appendages of unripeness; but they should all have been shaped accordantly with the central principle involved—the principle of fraternity that aimed at ultimate embodied or actualized fraternization. Hence the

main intent and power of all penal structures should have been educational and reformatory instead of repressive and maledictory.

An instance comes to mind, where, almost within a stone's throw of our present writing, the head manager of a criminal institution avowed it to be his especial purpose to treat his subjects with such severity that they would not come back again to his charge. And such adverse, base conceptions seem mostly to rule, not only criminal administration, but criminal legislation.

We have nationally sowed for a magnificent harvest; but if we tread down and mutilate the crop, in rash and bungling impatience during our efforts to cultivate, we can hardly expect to reap as we have sowed. Only consistent culture can assure the harvest. Let our statesmen, therefore, proceed to form and direct anew, in more strict conformity to the demands of our national genius, and so correct those flagrant violations that frustrate our national hopes and tend to destruction. Neither true heart nor head will counsel any sentimental folly that would shelter social offenders from stern tutelage. Those criminally offensive, and in any way adverse to tolerable social order, must be held to courses of tutelage as constant and true as our heart-throbs; and with equally constant purpose to purify the particles, and send health, vigor, and the ruddiest glow of a common life, throughout the whole system. Until we do thus conform to the national pledge and the national demands we shall be in constant peril of national destruction, and shall continue to be played upon by dire inflictions to the end. We may easily avert such evils by projecting institutions—tutelary and educational—strictly conforming to the commanding national thought, being sure to have them faithfully administered accordingly.

Nothing could prompt us to present or urge useless innovations or impracticable measures. All seeming urgency proceeds solely upon such a knowledge of the constitutional law, developing law, and finally organizing law of social order, as leaves one no option as to the choice of action in the case. With Paul we feel under bonds to say some word, duly authorized, to disturb prevailing lethargy, and arouse

statesmen and moralists from their present state of alarming mental photopsia. It is not that present institutions are too lax or unexact in their aims at a tolerable order, but that they are largely mistaken and inefficient; which prompts criticism and protest and a call for reform. They "carry us into captivity, and yet require of us a song; they waste us, and in return expect of us mirth."

Our institutions—at least our statesmen—do not sufficiently take into account that man is never so truly man as when standing in the full stature of integral freedom; and that such freedom is dependent upon the attainment of fullest amity between the private and public man, and that all provisional or educational means must be strictly designed accordingly. True statesmanlike endeavor will at once comprehend the whole situation. It will see that the grand national mistake consisted in an attempt to ignore the demands of national development and culture towards an involved end or object, and thereupon an endeavor to enter into full occupancy and use, as if the full structure were accomplished from the first, and ready to dispense its blessings accordingly. The proceeding was as absurd and fruitful of disaster as were that of a party in want of a physical structure to shelter and serve him variously, who, upon securing a satisfactory plan and specifications, proceeds to lay the foundations, and then to immediate occupancy and use. True, statesmanlike vision will see and aim to correct this great error, though it cannot annul the national experience of heats and chills and stormy peltings already felt in consequence of the blunder.

Thus the question constantly recurs, and demands equally constant consideration, how may we outgrow and amend? The dreadful events of our daily experience being distressingly impressive in witness of the count we make—aye, in witness of our utter inability to make that count in sufficiently impressive terms—there can be no room for indifference either in word or deed. Under God's providence the full remedy is possible; aye, it is certain; but it were better that it come through our intelligent coöperation than through the experimental bungling of mere intuition endeavor. In the former case all will proceed in beautiful order and peace; in the latter, in disorder and painful commotions, being attended

with large breaks, or interruptions, that betoken for a time final failure. In order that our statesmen may more truly comprehend the needs, and that the promise of our republic may not end in such a break, let us renewedly try to outline the path that must be opened and faithfully trodden in order to plant our feet securely upon the foundations of the New City, wherein, alone, the Grand Man can become duly conscious of ample social integrity.

In the whole range of our national endeavor we must dispose ourselves with the docility of little children, and begin to study and learn anew. We must heartily turn from the ways and means heretofore relied upon and found impotent to serve, and implore God that our eyes may be opened to see, and our hands nerved to do, the right. We must come to know that life mistakenly expressed, and goring us at every point with its violence, cannot be righted by violence in return. Nor can it be repressed by any obstructive device that can be erected—as we ought to learn ere long. Human conduct may be directed or duly ordered, but can never be annulled or choked off—not with desired effect. Coming to a due sense of the truth of these allegations, a new endeavor arises, and new studies begin, through which we may hope to conduct the human forces, that now destructively play upon us, into productive channels. “How?” By the use of new institutions, graded to fit all the varying needs—institutions that shall reach out and humanly embrace every factor of the social compact that in any way inclines to debauch or to subvert the public interests. Social material, while yet in the rough, must be seized and firmly held, and properly shaped for the great structure in view.

In agriculture, physical chemistry is coming to lend itself to the conversion of offensive decay and poisonous stench into the priceless wealth of abundant fertilization and growth. It is high time that political and social science were sounding the depths of those matchless human chemical stores in reserve, whereby present social and political filth and poison may as surely be transformed into means of equal productive worth in these higher realms of life and experience.

Perfect personal liberty is surely essential to the constitution of the fully conscious Grand Man—to social order fully

achieved; but the *unqualified* factors thereof must first be seized and forced, if necessary, into *qualifying* processes. They must be trained in the use of due means for manly development—achievement of character—and held firmly to the task, even if personally averse. The personal freedom of a partial culture may rightly be held in immediate abeyance, always with a view to fitting the subject for the enduring freedom of a perfected composite culture. Accordingly, the public must sternly command and direct the private force in all needful ways, in order to educe—educate—unfold such force to best purposes, and never to circumscribe or despoil in any way. For instance, the ballot should be withheld until suffrage is first qualified, measurably at least, according to the great behests of our national standard of intelligent and virtuous manhood. Not for the purpose of defrauding or despoiling the subject, but for the purpose of assuring his interests, which his own unqualified action would be quite sure to undermine. He were thus not a direct or active power in government, but none the less an indirect or passive power, ruling perforce of needs intelligently apprehended rather than by the exercise of his own unintelligent will. One involuntarily shudders in view of the great peril of our nation in consequence of an attempt to realize universal suffrage ere such suffrage were duly qualified. Men truly enough saw that it was involved in our system, but failed to see that its investing conditions must be first provided before it could prove safe and salutary in actual experience.

When our legislation comes to appreciate the national needs and to apply itself accordingly, it will proceed to command and organize all institutions in the clear interest of every citizen. It will make our national structure one great “ring,” or organic form, that shall play upon all minor rings and make them all variously tributary to the highest welfare of every citizen. The invincible spirit of combination, organization, association, that gives character to the present era and exhibits its powers in countless partial and conflicting organic forms or rings, must come under the dictation of competent ordering and qualifying intelligence, which will give adequate form and augmented force thereto, thus finally exhibiting a grand national unity that shall hold and operate

every fibre of the immense system in exactest order. Initiatory thereto, legislation should at once project and properly man a series of institutions that will tend to carry every particle of the blood of the Grand Man into healthy circulation, gradually working it clear of all impurities, and giving the whole form the glow of immortal health and beauty. If repressive and penal institutions be kept for a time—as doubtless they must—they should be ordered and conducted anew. Criminal offenders should be duly classified and brought under the play of the most ennobling incentives to manly conduct. Stimulating influences should be constantly made to bear in fostering manly endeavor and strength, and securing actual growth and permanent reform. “Population is wealth,” and all decimation should be carefully prevented. In order that such wealth be converted to highest value, the broad vision of ripest statesmanship must come in to devise and direct and construct to the sublime human ends in view. Social intuitions that confusedly develope and organize must give place to social science. Not to a merely nominal or miscalled social science—itself hobbling with infirmity—but to the clear vision that determines all previous events, and assures every onward and upward step in the sure light of the End. That End, alone, must truly determine all means; hence no developing nor organizing means can proceed with infallible effect unless such means be dictated solely by its ample lumen, held by the intellect as positive science. Beneath its transforming rays, not only spears will be turned into pruning-hooks and swords into ploughshares, but criminal courts and prison-houses will gradually melt away, giving place to Social Directories and Reformatories, which again will grow into hierarchal Councils overlooking palatial homes, temples of worship, art, science, education, industry, recreation, amusements, where will centre and abide all the graces and delights of Divine-Human Social Order.

LOGIC.

By JOSEPH G. ANDERSON.

Whatever exists is a thing or being. The words "thing" and "being" are used convertibly. Things are of two kinds, Substances or beings by themselves, and Qualities or beings by accident or by or through another. "For *Being* (τὸ ὄν, *ens*) is primarily divided into *Being by itself* (*ens per se*) and *Being by accident* (*ens per accidens*)."*

Logic is the science of the Laws of Substances and Qualities *as substances and qualities*.

Every logical term names a substance or class of substances. A term may include in its signification all the individuals in a class (that is, the whole class), or a part of them only. When all the individuals are included the term is said to be universal, otherwise particular.

All substances outside of, or not belonging to, or included in, a class may be considered together as forming another class, which is the negative of the first. Hence results an axiomatic law:—Law I. Every class added to its negative equals or rather constitutes the class all substances. A negative class as well as a positive one may be considered all together or otherwise, and therefore negative terms may also be universal or particular in the same manner as positive terms.

There are, then, four classes of terms produced by this cross division of universal and particular, positive and negative terms, namely, the positive universal, the negative universal, the positive particular, and the negative particular.

Now let capital letters be used as universal terms and small letters as particular terms; let Roman letters be used as positive terms and Italic letters as negative terms. Thus, A as the positive universal term, the usual expression therefor being "All A"; A as the negative universal term, for which there is, perhaps, no exact equivalent commonly used, but which would mean the same as "All non-A," or "All ex-

* Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, p. 141.

cept (or besides) A "; a as the positive particular, usually "Some A "; \bar{a} as the negative particular, equivalent to "Some non- A ," or a portion of what is outside the class A .

The particular terms a and \bar{a} are indefinite in their meaning, being equivalent to any "some A ," or any part of A , and are accordingly used when it is wished to signify an indefinite part of the class A . a' and \bar{a}' are used when it is desired to signify some definite part of the class A or the class A .

Discretive identity is the relation which two classes bear to each other when the same individuals which constitute one constitute the other also. The whole of one class may be discretively identical with the whole of another or with a part of another, or a part with a part. Now let a colon ($:$) placed between two terms be the sign of identity—indicate that the classes signified are discretively identical.

A proposition is a statement that two classes are discretively identical.

By the various combinations of the four classes of terms, sixteen propositions will result as follows:

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|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| (1) $A:B$, | (5) $A:b$, | (9) $a:B$, | (13) $a:b$, |
| (2) $A:\bar{B}$, | (6) $A:\bar{b}$, | (10) $a:\bar{B}$, | (14) $a:\bar{b}$, |
| (3) $\bar{A}:B$, | (7) $\bar{A}:b$, | (11) $\bar{a}:B$, | (15) $\bar{a}:b$, |
| (4) $\bar{A}:\bar{B}$, | (8) $\bar{A}:\bar{b}$, | (12) $\bar{a}:\bar{B}$, | (16) $\bar{a}:\bar{b}$. |

These are all convertible. When $A:B$, $B:A$; when $A:b$, $b:A$, and so throughout. It will be observed that several of the propositions are substantially alike and that the number of propositions might thus be reduced to ten; but, for reasons that will appear hereafter, all are retained.

A number of inferences, commonly called immediate, arise from the first twelve propositions. Of these there are two series. The first arise in accordance with the following axiomatic law:—Law II. When a whole class is discretively identical with another whole class, or with part of another class, then any part of the first class will be discretively identical with a part of the second class.

In other words: What is true of each individual contained in a whole class, is also true of each individual contained in any part of that class.

Applying this law to the first twelve propositions, we have

From (1) $A:B, a:b;$	From (7) $A:b, a:b;$
" (2) $A:B, a:b;$	" (8) $A:b, a:b;$
" (3) $A:B, a:b;$	" (9) $a:B, a:b;$
" (4) $A:B, a:b;$	" (10) $a:B, a:b;$
" (5) $A:b, a:b;$	" (11) $a:B, a:b;$
" (6) $A:b, a:b;$	" (12) $a:B, a:b.$

While the particular term in the last eight examples does not change its form, there is in reality a lessening in the quantity of the term exactly corresponding to that in the other member of the proposition. So in the other four propositions while there may be an inference drawn in the same manner as in the first twelve, it would produce no change of form in the proposition. This can be made to appear as follows: in the proposition $a:b$, let us make both terms definite, $a':b'$; now let a'' be a part of a' and b'' be the corresponding part of b' , then we have the inference from $a':b'$, $a'':b''$.

The second series of inferences arise in accordance with the following laws:

Law III. When a whole class is discretively identical with another whole class, the whole of the negative of the first class will be discretively identical with the whole of the negative of the second class.

Law IV. When a whole class is discretively identical with a part of another class, then a part of the negative of the first class is discretively identical with the whole of the negative of the second class.

These laws are demonstrated as follows:

Law III. When $A:B, A:B$.

Let Z be all substances:

Then $A+A:Z$, by Law I.;

but $A:B$,

therefore $B+A:Z$.

But $B+B:Z$,

therefore $A:B$.

$A+A:B+B$, by Law I.

Dropping A from one side, and its equivalent B from the other, we have $A:B$.

This reasoning may also be stated thus: If the classes A and B exactly coincide, then must their negatives also exactly coincide.

Law IV. When $A:b, a:B$.

$A+A:Z;$
 $A:b;$
 $\therefore b+A:Z,$
 or $A:Z-b.$
 Let $b+b':B,$
 then $b+b'+B:Z,$
 or $b'+B:Z-b,$
 whence $A:b'+B.$
 Let $b+b':B,$
 $A+A:b+b'+B,$
 $\therefore A:b'+B.$

Dropping b' from one side, and the corresponding portion of A from the other, we have $a:B$.

Applying law III. to the first four propositions, and law IV. to the next eight, we have

From (1) $A:B, A:B;$	From (7) $A:b, a:B;$
" (2) $A:B, A:B;$	" (8) $A:b, a:B;$
" (3) $A:B, A:B;$	" (9) $a:B, A:b;$
" (4) $A:B, A:B;$	" (10) $a:B, A:b;$
" (5) $A:b, a:B;$	" (11) $a:B, A:b;$
" (6) $A:b, a:B;$	" (12) $a:B, A:b.$

Neither of these laws apply to the last four propositions. The only inference from them is, first making both terms definite and letting $a'+a'':A$ and $b'+b'':B$, when $a':b', A+a'':B+b''$.

A Syllogism is an inference from two propositions having a common term which in the syllogism is called the middle term. The law of this inference is:

Law V. Classes discretively identical with the same class are discretively identical with each other. When $A:B$ and $B:C, A:C$.

By the various combinations of the sixteen propositions, two hundred and fifty-six pairs of premise-propositions will result as given in the following table, which also gives the conclusion, if any, to be derived from each:

- No conclusion can be reached.

It will be observed that the same figure, that is, the same order of terms and propositions, is used throughout the table. This is done because we thus get every possible variation of the simple syllogism, the figure otherwise making not the slightest difference. If it were attempted to produce syllogisms in the other three possible figures, it would be found in effect to result in a simple repetition of the same syllogism. The conclusion is deduced from the two identities, and it makes no difference which proposition comes first, or, in each proposition, which term comes first.

In many of the cases in the table the conclusion is reached directly in accordance with law V. In others, however, it is necessary first to transform one or both the premises by laws II., III. and IV., or some of them, before a conclusion can be reached.

By examination of the table, it is found that a conclusion can be reached in every instance where two or more of the four terms contained in any two premise-propositions in the table are universal, and that too whatever be the variation of the terms as to quality.

When but one of the four terms is universal, a conclusion can be reached in all cases (and in those only) where the universal term is the middle term in one of the propositions and the middle term in the other proposition is of the same quality, that is, positive when the universal term is positive and negative when the universal term is negative, or where the propositions can be reduced to that form by the application of law III. or IV.

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find objectively valid thoughts. Even Reflection is an activity partly confined to images which it is unable wholly to transcend. It cannot seize the living process, and is therefore inadequate to state what is universally and necessarily valid in the objective world. The Speculative Reason, however, is occupied solely in the contemplation of this living process not only as defined in pure thought, but also as manifested in the world of Experience.

11. Think in universals. Place every idea "under the form of eternity"; i.e. make it universal, and see what will come of it. Its dialectic will then appear. The dialectic is the soul of the whole revealing itself in the part. The partial exhibits its implications or presuppositions when it is posited as universal by thought. Trace out these implications and the true whole will appear.

12. That there hovers before the mind a "presupposition of the world from which abstraction has been made" when one discusses pure being, is a critical saying of Trendelenburg. Undoubtedly he is right; but of what nature is this presupposition? It is not a presupposition of some idea more simple than Being—of some idea that must be thought before thinking Being. On the contrary, Being is the idea that must necessarily be thought prior to the idea of the world. Let one endeavor to think the world (or any other concrete idea), and his first mental act will be the predication of the undetermined Being of it: the world is. The second act of thought will necessarily be the simple first determination of it—the thought of its negation or limit. The next thought (whether this process is conscious or unconscious, it is, all the same, involved in every mental act of seizing an idea) will be that of the synthesis of its Being and its limit, and only after these three steps will the mind recognize before it the definite being of its object. These three steps are rarely separated consciously; their result alone is seized as the first step. The triad Being, Naught, and Becoming, takes us but a little way forward in Logic. Hegel considered it the nadir of pure thought, and opposite to it held up the idea of Personality as the zenith of his system (*"Die höchste zugespitzte Spitze"*). But the spirit of his method may be exhibited even in these barren abstractions.

The Dialectic is a process of passing from Seeming to Truth. Pure Science furnishes the general formulas for the solution of all problems. It is a Calculus, a general theory without which particular solution is impossible, inasmuch as it underlies all synthesis.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

In the present number of the Journal we offer our views on the Method of Hegel as a contribution to the settlement of the question of Speculative Dialectic. If we can only ascertain what thoughts and ideas in our minds have the most unmistakable universality (of application) and necessity, we can ascertain what thoughts and ideas have the most objective validity. For what we *must* think on a given subject is the logical condition of all experience regarding that subject. The article to which we refer is the result of thirteen years' thinking on Hegel's results. The third or "critical exposition" is the final (and to us satisfactory) statement which explains the other views. It is made with special reference to the objections of Trendelenburg in regard to the matter of presupposition and beginning, as well as the objections of English and American writers, who generally attack the objective validity of Hegel's Logic.

The following notes on Vera's polemic against Trendelenburg will be of interest here :

Vera on Trendelenburg.

Mr. Editor :

I have just been reading over the article in No. 25 of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, entitled "Trendelenburg on Hegel's System," and translated from the Preface of Prof. Vera's Introduction to Hegel. The title should have been—should it not?—"A. Vera on Trendelenburg"; for the article is a series of observations on Trendelenburg's supposed doctrines, and not an account of Trendelenburg's famous criticism of the dialectic method. The stand-point and consequent doctrine attributed to Trendelenburg seem to me so different from those really held by him, that I have thought it might be worth while, for the benefit of any among your readers who have not made a special study of Trendelenburg's works, to write a few words of explanation and correction.

I. The logic of Trendelenburg is not written from the stand-point of the Hegelian logic. Since M. Vera, after asserting the contrary, himself ad-

mits the truth of what I state (he says, *in loc. cit.*, p. 29, that the "dialectic" of Trendelenburg is not "any dialectic whatever, but rather the contrary of all dialectic," and what is the Hegelian logic if not dialectic?) yet it may be well enough to state what Trendelenburg's logic is. It is true that T. rejects the so-called formal logic; but from this it does not follow that he must therefore adopt the Hegelian logic. The contrary is so true, that it is notorious that Trendelenburg did more to weaken the credit of the Hegelian logic, both in its "general and fundamental point of view" and in its "form," than any one among his contemporaries. The Hegelian logic affirms the identity of thought and being, identifies therefore logic and metaphysics, and asserts the possibility of a dialectical development of all the qualifications of being (or of the absolute) in pure thought. Trendelenburg denies all these positions, holding, however, that there must be a principle common to thought, as an ideal function, and to objective being, in order to the possibility of any act of knowledge. But thought, for Trendelenburg, is not being, nor is being thought; hence logic is not metaphysics; and as thought, in the view of Trendelenburg, depends on a principle present in physical being (*viz.* motion, which has its ideal, but not independent, counterpart in thought), it can develop nothing in absolute independence of that faculty by which motion is apprehended, *viz.* *Anschaung*, or intuition, in the etymological sense of this term, including therefore the sensibility; hence a dialectical development by *pure* thought, is of course held to be impossible. Trendelenburg's logic is the logic of Aristotle, in which he conceives the forms and processes of thought to bear a relation of demonstrable correspondence to the general relations of things. But Aristotle's logic, it need not be said, is no dialectic. As to Trendelenburg's "Logical Investigations," they are not primarily an exposition of logic, but constitute an attempt to lay the ground for metaphysics and logic, or to establish a Theory of Science.

II. There is no triad in Trendelenburg's system, certainly none that is put forth as such, nor any that can be demonstrated to be such in the sense required by, or in a sense imitated from, the dialectic method. Much less is there, as in Hegel's logic, a series of triads following each other in dialectic development. Trendelenburg seeks to account for the possibility of knowledge, and more especially for the element of scientific necessity. To accomplish this he proceeds in the ordinary scientific way, assuming provisionally the fact to be explained, just as the theory of vision assumes the reality of vision, and seeking for an hypothesis which shall explain the facts. He proceeds thus from the particular and the known to the general and the unknown, or from the "prior for us" (in Aristotelian phraseology) to the "prior in nature." The simplest analysis of an act of knowledge discloses the antithesis of subject and object, "thought" and "being." These are not assumed as starting-points given in absolute knowledge from which to proceed in dialectical development. They are simply found empirically to exist as different factors in all cognitive acts, and the distinction, in the form of theory or method and subject-matter, is found concretely exemplified in all the positive sciences. To explain, now, the possible union or harmony of thought and being in knowledge, an hypothesis is selected

and tried, like any other scientific hypothesis, by its power of explaining the facts. In this there is no talk and no semblance of triads or triadic development, or of any species of dialectic. The method is simply that of ordinary, accredited science.

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Dec. 5, 1873.

GEO. S. MORRIS.

BOOK NOTICES.

History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Time. By Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, late Professor of Philosophy in the University of Königsberg. Translated from the fourth German Edition by Geo. S. Morris, A.M., Professor of Modern Languages in the University of Michigan, and Associate of the Victoria Institute, London.—*Vol. II.* History of Modern Philosophy. With Additions, &c. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874.

As our readers are already informed, this work constitutes the first of the Philosophical Division of the Theological and Philosophical Library, "A Series of Text-books, original and translated, for Colleges and Theological Seminaries, edited by Henry B. Smith, D.D., and Philip Schaff, D.D., Professors in the Union Theological Seminary, New York." It is a truly meritorious undertaking, and deserves more than the mere approval of American students in Theology or Philosophy. The two volumes on the History of Philosophy now published should be in the library of every person interested in the thoughts of the world's greatest thinkers. So complete a storehouse of information as regards the history of Philosophy has never before been accessible in English. The work of Ueberweg is noted for its conscientious accuracy and the minuteness of its bibliographical information. The translator, Professor Morris, has, in our judgment carried away the palm before all rival translators from German Philosophy. That his work is *con amore* we find evidence on every page. How thoroughly he has himself studied certain special systems of Philosophy is shown in his full account of the system of Trendelenburg which is added as an appendix to the brief paragraph of Ueberweg. Professor Morris has likewise diligently searched the English sources for information regarding any of the Philosophers, and has added under appropriate heads references to English translations and commentaries which will prove of great service to the English reader. The "Appendix on English and American Philosophy, by Noah Porter, D.D., LL.D., President of Yale College, and the second appendix "On Italian Philosophy, by Vincenzo Botta, Ph.D., late Professor of Philosophy in the University of Turin," are elaborated in the spirit of Ueberweg by thoroughly capable and equally fair-minded scholars.

The readers of this Journal have had occasional glimpses of the great Philosophical activity in Italy. Dr. Botta is intimately acquainted with the whole movement, and indeed has been an active participant in it. President Porter's account of American Philosophy is a contribution to a new subject. His treatment of it will, we trust, stimulate others to investigate the same field. The reciprocal action of Theological and Metaphysical thinking in this country is a theme that deserves exhaustive elaboration.

We know of nothing that would so much help the cause of Philosophy in America. For it is the Theological Seminaries of this country and not the Colleges which make the professional thinkers. An indigenous philosophy here must originate in Theological soil.—We find an exquisite specimen of the dry humor of Dr. Porter in a foot-note to his account of Herbert Spencer's system. It runs thus:

"The system of Spencer is still under criticism, and perhaps may not have been fully expounded by its author. Possibly it has not yet been completely developed. Should Spencer continue to devote to Philosophy his active energies for many years, it is not inconceivable that new associations may take possession of that physiological organization which he is accustomed to call himself, and perhaps be evolved into another system of first principles which may displace those which he has taught hitherto."

Of the original power of speculative thought possessed by Ueberweg one cannot speak very highly. His critical remarks in this work are seldom of value, and, fortunately, few in number. An example of these which will give the reader an insight into his calibre as a thinker we will quote. It is a note relative to Kant's criteria for *a priori* knowledge. That Kant held universality and necessity to be sure signs of non-empirical cognition, he tells us is the fundamental mistake from which the whole critical system of Kant grew up.

"The principle of gravitation which is strictly universal in its truth, and yet, as Kant admits, is derived from experience, is alone enough to refute him. The simpler the subject of a science, so much the more certain is the universal validity of its inductively-acquired principles; so that from Arithmetic (quantity) to Geometry, Mechanics, &c., a *gradation* in the measure of certainty, and not, as Kant affirms, an *absolute* difference in universality, subsists. The empirical basis of Geometry is admitted by mathematicians of such weight as Riemann and Helmholtz."

That the principle of gravitation is *universal and necessary*, in the Kantian use of these terms, is a supposition worthy of a place in Lewes's Biographical History of Philosophy, but not of a place in a book emanating from Königsberg and written by a Professor in the University that Kant honored by his long labors in Philosophy.

A few typographical errors observed by us we omit to mention as they are corrected ere this in a new edition of the work.

Boston Lectures, 1872.—Christianity and Scepticism: Embracing a Consideration of important traits of Christian Doctrine and Experience, and of the leading Facts in the Life of CHRIST. Boston: Congregational Publishing Society, 1873.

The contents of this volume consist of nine lectures, forming the third course of "Boston Lectures." The first and fifth were delivered by two of the ablest divines of the West—the former by Rev. Dr. Magoun of Iowa College, the latter by Rev. Dr. Post of St. Louis. The subject of the first lecture: "The Adjustment between the Natural Law of Progress and Christian Law." It exhibits the Christian Religion as a system not merely adapted to the wants of mankind, but as fundamentally necessary to the progress of the race. The topic of the fifth lecture is "The Incarnation." This volume seems to bring out the prominent doctrines of Christianity in a treatment at once popular and profound.

An Analysis of Schiller's Tragedy, DIE BRAUT VON MESSINA, after Aristotle's Poetic: Being an Inaugural Dissertation for obtaining the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, at the Georgia Augusta University in Göttingen by Isaac Flagg (at present Professor in Cornell University).

This essay is a fine example of the kind of æsthetic criticism which we need in our higher institutions of learning. The student must be shown the presuppositions of the ancient works of art before he can form a true estimate of them or be genuinely affected by them. The discussion in this essay following the Aristotelian categories of the Poetics treats, I. The Complication,¹ (a) events within the action, (b) events outside the action; II. The Development,² (a) the discoveries,³ (b) the revolution,⁴ (c) the calamities.⁵

We suggest *resolution* or *solution* for the category "development" used by the author.

The Rising Faith. By C. A. Bartol, author of "Radical Problems." Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1874.

The contents of this book include the following topics: The Seeker, The Seer, The Secret Power, Sincerity, Sex, Teaching, Training, Forms, Values, Validity, Personality, Prayer, Unity, Survival, Signs, Ideas.

In the chapter on Personality, our author says: "This is the curiosity of speculation, that a creature should, with its own, doubt its Author's consciousness." "Human unfolding is into personality ever more pronounced. Lost in Deity? The more we are absorbed the more we are found and find ourselves. The infant is confounded with other persons and things. But out of this baby imperfection is developed the character of Charlemagne, or Luther, reaching by differentiation its union with the Most High, as the root of a tree widens with its top." "You tell me God is not personal. From the unconsoling statement how much do I learn? What else is He *not*? What more important quality can you eliminate? What is personality but the focus or burning-point where all the faculties meet, the concentration in which judgment and memory flame into genius, the grip wherein every ability is hurled to accomplishment; the property whose scale with each new degree is the measure of greatness?"

There is nothing in this book that is not inspiring. It is the very atmosphere of hope and aspiration. Like the Cologne Cathedral, all its lines lead upward to the sky, and whatever is depressing or manifests gravitation is allowed to appear only in some subordinate shape—a pendant that seems to look earthward, but is prevented from reaching the floor by reason of the strong counter-impulse it receives from the roof which carries it upward.

Life's Mystery. Philadelphia: Henry Longstreth. 1873. "From Old-fashioned Ethics and Common-sense Metaphysics." By William Thomas Thornton Mac Millan & Co. London."

A discussion of the problem of evil in metre.

Crimes of Passion and Crimes of Reflection. By J. B. Bittinger.

Reprint from the Princeton Review for April, 1873. An able discussion.

The River of Life. A music book for Sunday Schools, &c. By H. S. Perkins and Wm. M. Bentley. Boston: Oliver Ditson & Co. 1873. For sale by Balmer & Weber, St. Louis, Mo.

Clarke's Dollar Instructor for the Reed Organ. By Wm. H. Clarke. Boston: Oliver Ditson & Co. For sale by Balmer & Weber, St. Louis, Mo.

¹ δέσις. ² λύσις. ³ ἀναγνώρισις. ⁴ περιπέτεια. ⁵ πάθη.

Back Volumes

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